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Superstorm Sandy at Five: Lessons on Law as Catalyst and Obstacle to Long-term
Recovery Following Catastrophic Disasters
by Donovan Finn and John Travis Marshall

Donovan Finn is an Assistant Professor of Environmental Design, Policy, and Planning in
the Sustainability Studies Program and School of Marine and Atmospheric Sciences at Stony
Brook University. He has a Ph.D., 2009, and M.U.P, 2004, from the University of Illinois at
Urbana-Champaign, and a B.A., 2000, from the University of Kansas. John Travis
Marshall is an Assistant Professor of Law, Georgia State University College of Law. He has
a J.D., 1997, from the University of Florida College of Law, an M.A., 1994, from the
University of Texas at Austin, and a B.A., 1990, from the University of Notre Dame.
Hurricane Sandy has often been referred to as a “wake-up call” for the most densely populated
region of the United States, which includes New York City, coastal New Jersey, and suburban
Long Island (New York).1 Most would agree that this region is currently thriving. It rebounded
vigorously from the devastating September 11th terrorist attacks and is home to some of the
country’s most valuable real estate, iconic cultural landmarks, and productive industries.2

Authors’ Note: The authors gratefully acknowledge that research for this Article was supported, in part, by funding
from the National Science Foundation (NSF Award #1335109) and from a summer research grant provided to Dean
Wendy Hensel and Dean Steven Kaminshine, Georgia State University College of Law. Participants in the 2017
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Dycus of Vermont Law School, Ed Richards of Louisiana State University, Amy Hardberger of St. Mary’s
University Law School, Jane Cohen of the University of Texas, and Bret Wells of the University of Houston Law
Center. Ann-Margaret Esnard with Georgia State University’s Andrew Young School of Policy Studies provided
important recommendations for improving this Article. Jeff Thomas, Esq., also shared expert input after reviewing a
draft of this Article. The authors would also like to thank Max Bowen for his excellent assistance with research and
editing.
1
See, e.g., Beth Gardiner, Britain Haunted by Risk of Flooding, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 21, 2013 (“Hurricane Sandy was
a wake-up call around coastal flooding”), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/03/22/business/energyenvironment/britain-haunted-by-risk-of-flooding.html; DESIGNING FOR FLOOD RISK, infra note 17, at 5.
See Konrad Putzier, NYC vs. the World, REAL DEAL N.Y., Oct. 1, 2015 (discussing New York City’s rising real
estate prices and their continuing climb that will likely outpace other expensive cities such as London and Hong
Kong in the near future), https://therealdeal.com/issues_articles/nyc-vs-the-world/; TripAdvisor, Top 25
Landmarks—United States (as of April 19, 2018, five of the top 10 landmarks in the United States are in New York
City), https://www.tripadvisor.com/TravelersChoice-Landmarks-cTop-g191 (last visited Apr. 19, 2018); IHS
GLOBAL INSIGHT, U.S. METRO ECONOMIES (2013) (New York City and northern New Jersey areas have almost
2
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However, Sandy exposed the region’s fundamental and ongoing vulnerability to major hazards
and illustrates how all communities, even those with access to financial and technical resources
and possessing experience with recovery, can face structural challenges that complicate
recovery. The storm not only served as a wake-up call about the region’s lack of physical
protection from extreme events and slow-onset climate change, but also served notice that the
existing legal infrastructure for recovery3 was, and remains, inadequate.
Foundational to city resilience are laws and policies.4 These range from federal programs
that fund recovery projects, to local comprehensive plans and zoning codes, to state
constitutional provisions and statutes. As post-Sandy rebuilding efforts have illustrated, and as
major natural disasters preceding Sandy have also proven, the laws and policies that guide
federal, state, and local government recovery activities can impede—instead of facilitate—
robust and equitable rebuilding efforts. If, before an event, a community fails to address potential
deficiencies with the statutes, ordinances, policies, and procedures relevant to recovery, then
these shortcomings may frustrate recovery from future disasters.

double the gross metropolitan product of the next highest city in the United States),
https://web.archive.org/web/20150305224230/http://www.usmayors.org/metroeconomies/2013/201311-report.pdf.
We write more than five years after Sandy’s destructive landfall to consider lessons emerging from the New York
metropolitan region’s long-term recovery. Generally speaking, “recovery” begins as the immediate disaster
“response” phase ends. Response includes search and rescue and emergency food and shelter provision. The
“recovery” phase, which follows, includes “timely restoration, strengthening and revitalization of infrastructure,
housing and a sustainable economy, as well as the health, social, cultural, historic and environmental fabric of
communities affected by a catastrophic incident.” See FEDERAL EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT AGENCY (FEMA), U.S.
DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY, NATIONAL PREPAREDNESS GOAL (2d ed. 2015), available at
https://www.fema.gov/media-library-data/14437996151712aae90be55041740f97e8532fc680d40/National_Preparedness_Goal_2nd_Edition.pdf. See also John Travis
Marshall et al., Core Capabilities and Capacities of Developer Nonprofits in Postdisaster Community Rebuilding,
18 NAT. HAZARDS REV. 15016004 (2017) (“Long-term disaster recovery begins when neighborhood rebuilding is
poised to commence. This is generally about the time homes and vehicles have been cleared from the streets, but
also when housing, roads, sewers, libraries, and parks remain in ruin.”); Elizabeth Kent, Note, “Where’s the
Cavalry,” Federal Response to 21st Century Disasters, 40 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 181, 194-95 & n.103 (2006)
(quoting David McLoughlin, A Framework for Integrated Emergency Management, 45 PUB. ADMIN. REV. 165, 166
(1985) (recovery includes the “long-term activities that return life to normal”)).
3

4

See, e.g., DANIEL A. FARBER ET AL., DISASTER LAW AND POLICY 345-64, 369-90 (2d ed. 2010); Anna K. Schwab
& David J. Brower, Increasing Resilience to Natural Hazards: Obstacles and Opportunities for Local Governments
Under the Disaster Mitigation Act of 2000, 38 ELR 10171, 10173-74 (Mar. 2008); Patricia E. Salkin, Sustainability
at the Edge: The Opportunity and Responsibility of Local Governments to Most Effectively Plan for Natural
Disaster Mitigation, 38 ELR 10158, 10158 (Mar. 2008); John R. Nolon, Disaster Mitigation Through Land Use
Strategies, 23 PACE ENVTL. L. REV. 959, 963-64 (2006). See also John Travis Marshall, Rating the Cities:
Constructing a City Resilience Index for Assessing the Effects of State and Local Laws on Long-term Recovery from
Crisis and Disaster, 90 TUL. L. REV. 35, 36-41 (2015).
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In response to the lessons learned after Sandy, the region’s local and state governments
have expended significant effort to update state and local codes and lobby for changes to federal
policy.5 The federal government has also begun to address some of these issues.6 But the
challenges are far from resolved. These issues also have important implications well beyond the
New York and New Jersey region most directly affected by Sandy and offer lessons for sister
cities of all sizes. The pitfalls that have revealed themselves over the past five years have
common pathology to the miscues and oversights documented during long-term recovery
processes that have previously unfolded in other regions of the country. In other words, the same
types of challenges faced by the New York City region’s residents, businesses, local
governments, and states may be pertinent to subsequent recoveries including those recently
commenced in Texas, Florida, and Puerto Rico following the 2017 hurricane season.
This Article examines the programs that New York City, the state of New York, and the
state of New Jersey created to help deliver desperately needed federal assistance to residents and
businesses throughout the region.7 As might be expected of any multibillion-dollar enterprise
conceived and developed in a matter of just a few months, these programs had flaws and
shortcomings. Among the challenges the city and the states faced were federal funding sources
constricted by rigid regulations and local government laws ill-suited to the exigencies of disaster
recovery. We focus on these law-related obstacles encountered during the post-Sandy disaster
response and recovery, highlighting ways that state and local governments attempted to work
within the constraints of existing legal structures to develop locally effective recovery programs.
5

See Samuel Greengard, Eye on the Storm: Engineering a Post-Sandy Recovery, ENGINEERING INC., Sept./Oct.
2017, at 16 (“Hurricane Sandy forced everyone, including the government and the engineering industry, to
completely rethink the way infrastructure is built, maintained and upgraded. The policy changes and code changes
resulting from Sandy will have a hugely positive impact in the years ahead”),
http://www.dewberry.com/docs/default-source/default-document-library/eye-on-the-storm-engineering-inc2017.pdf?sfvrsn=0.
6

See Sandy Recovery Improvement Act, Pub. L. No. 113-2, 127 Stat. 5 (2013). President Obama signed the Sandy
Recovery Improvement Act into law on January 29, 2013.
A separate important inquiry surrounds the steps that the New York City region has taken – and must take in the
future – to ensure its resilience to future storms and climate-related challenges. This article does not focus
specifically on the legal dimensions of New York and New Jersey’s post-Sandy efforts to promote urban resilience.
There are a range of resources to consult on this critical issue. See, e.g., Sarah Adams-Schoen, Sink or Swim: In
Search of a Model for Coastal City Climate Resilience, 40 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 433 (2015); Jessica Grannis, Vicki
Arroyo, et al., Preparing for Climate Impacts: Lessons from the Frontlines (July 2014), available at
https://kresge.org/sites/default/files/Preparing%20for%20Climate%20Impacts%20%20Georgetown%20Climate%20Center.pdf.; Andrea McArdle, Storm Surges, Disaster Planning, and Vulnerable
Populations at the Urban Periphery: Imagining a Resilient New York After Superstorm Sandy 50 Idaho L. Rev. 19
(2014).
7
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We also identify how certain laws emerged as structural barriers to community recovery
following Superstorm Sandy.
The Article proceeds as follows. Section I provides a brief overview of Hurricane Sandy,
its widespread devastation of New York and New Jersey, and the New York City metro area’s
distinctive urban form and socioeconomic profile—both characteristics that set the Sandy
recovery challenge apart from almost every other major U.S. disaster recovery experience.
Mindful that the U.S. government’s response to Sandy introduced major changes to federal
disaster response and recovery programs, Section II furnishes a succinct history of federal
involvement in disaster response and recovery leading up to October 2012. Section III
specifically outlines the major laws and programs that the federal, state, and local governments
used to manage the Sandy response and recovery efforts. Despite important refinements and
improvements to federal laws and programs that followed Hurricane Katrina and the 2008 Iowa
floods, Hurricane Sandy revealed critical flaws in the federal, state, and local coordination of
disaster recovery. Section IV details Sandy’s gloss on the several key disaster response and
recovery programs.
With the benefit of five years’ hindsight, Section V takes a critical look at the nation’s
second most expensive disaster recovery. This section demonstrates how disaster recovery can
be significantly impeded by flawed legal infrastructure through examination of several
significant challenges to a more equitable and efficient recovery. Section VI concludes by
considering how Superstorm Sandy’s long-term recovery can inform the deliberations of cities
nationally regarding the strengths and potential vulnerabilities of their local laws, institutions,
and capacities for promoting resilient recovery. We suggest six lessons or takeaways to guide not
only communities affected by Sandy but any community in the United States facing potential
hazards-related risks, which is to say, everyplace.

I.

Hurricane Sandy Brought Unprecedented Destruction to the Singularly
Distinctive New York Metro Region—An Overview

Each major natural disaster yields new lessons to share with communities that later find
themselves in the crosshairs of a catastrophic event. That is because each hazard event brings its
own unique challenges. It is also because those hazards strike new locations. As a result, there
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are often significant differences in the physical and legal landscapes of the affected communities.
Superstorm Sandy is a case in point.
Sandy’s massive size and destructive force set it apart from most other storms that have
hit U.S. cities. Its impacts on the New York City region were similarly singular given the
region’s older and high-density settlement patterns, its orientation to the water, and other special
characteristics. This section briefly highlights the factors that set Sandy apart and, in so doing,
have yielded important new lessons not only for other large metropolitan regions but for any
community that faces the prospect of a future disaster of any kind.
Hurricane Sandy (later downgraded to Superstorm Sandy) made landfall on the northeast
coast of the United States on October 29, 2012, first striking land near Atlantic City, New Jersey,
with 80 mile per hour winds, having already caused severe damage to Jamaica, Cuba, and the
Bahamas as well as the southern U.S. coast.8 Though the storm had already been downgraded by
the time of landfall, it was massive. Sandy’s nearly 1,000-mile diameter made it the largest
Atlantic storm on record while its record-setting low barometric pressure, 940 millibars or 27.76
inches, meant it was also the most powerful storm to ever make landfall north of Cape Hatteras,
North Carolina.9 Sandy’s 14-foot storm surge was a result of the storm’s massive size, coupled
with a full moon and a high tide at the time of landfall, further exacerbated by global sea-level
rise.10
Sandy struck an enormous region. In all, 24 states were affected in some way by the
storm, but by far the most concentrated impact was on the New York City metropolitan region,
including New York City, the entire state of New Jersey, and New York state’s suburban Long
Island counties of Nassau and Suffolk, located just east of New York City.11 This metro region
contains the nation’s largest and densest city but also small coastal communities and sprawling

8

See Tim Sharp, Superstorm Sandy: Facts About the Frankenstorm, LIVE SCI., Nov. 27, 2012,
https://www.livescience.com/24380-hurricane-sandy-status-data.html.
9

See Mark Fischetti, Sandy Versus Katrina, and Irene: Monster Hurricanes by the Numbers, SCI. AM., Oct. 29,
2012, https://www.scientificamerican.com/article/sandy-vs-katrina-and-irene/; Alan Duke, Superstorm Sandy
Breaks Records, CNN, Oct. 31, 2012, http://www.cnn.com/2012/10/30/us/sandy-records/index.html.
See Bob Henson, Dissecting Sandy’s Surge, ATMOSNEWS, Dec. 31, 2012 (examining factors that caused the
extreme storm surge associated with Superstorm Sandy, and what could have exacerbated the surge),
https://www2.ucar.edu/atmosnews/perspective/8585/dissecting-sandy-s-surge.
10

11

See FEMA, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY, HURRICANE SANDY FEMA AFTER-ACTION REPORT 1
(2013), https://www.fema.gov/media-library-data/20130726-1923-25045-7442/sandy_fema_aar.pdf.
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suburban regions spread across two states and over two dozen counties and hundreds of
municipalities.
The storm forced the practically unprecedented multiday shutdowns of the New York
City transit system, the New York Stock Exchange, and the New York City school system.12
Extensive coastal and inland flooding destroyed thousands of homes and damaged thousands
more, and 8.5 million customers lost power during the storm.13 At least 162 deaths were
ultimately attributed to the storm in the United States alone.14 The region’s infrastructure was
also severely impacted, including flooding of multiple rail tunnels under the Hudson and East
Rivers, New Jersey’s Hoboken Terminal rail station, and the runways at LaGuardia Airport.
Overall, Sandy was the second most economically damaging hurricane in U.S. history after the
$147.2 billion (adjusted to 2013 dollars) losses caused by Katrina. Sandy’s price tag totaled $68
billion worth of losses in the United States, including $30 billion in New Jersey and $33 billion
in New York state.15
The New York metro region’s distinctive social and urban development profiles created
special disaster response and recovery challenges. While the metro region includes buildings of
every type, it contains a much higher percentage of multiunit buildings and party-wall structures
than most other places in the United States.16 Additional challenges relate to the overall land use
patterns of the region, which include a much more fine-grained mix of uses than is typical in

See id. (reviewing FEMA’s response to Hurricane Sandy, noting areas of strength during disaster recovery, and
discussing areas of improvement for future disaster response efforts).
12

13

Id.

14

Id.

15

See AON BENFIELD, HURRICANE SANDY EVENT RECAP REPORT 19, 21, 38 (2013) (the $68 billion figure does not
include non-U.S. economic losses in the amount of $4 billion between the Caribbean, Bahamas, and Canada),
http://thoughtleadership.aonbenfield.com/Documents/20130514_if_hurricane_sandy_event_recap.pdf.
16

See NEW YORK CITY DEPARTMENT OF CITY PLANNING, COASTAL CLIMATE RESILIENCY: RETROFITTING
BUILDINGS FOR FLOOD RISK (2014) [hereinafter RETROFITTING BUILDINGS FOR FLOOD RISK] 15-21, available at
https:// https://www1.nyc.gov/assets/planning/download/pdf/plans-studies/retrofittingbuildings/retrofitting_complete.pdf; see also U.S. Census Bureau, American FactFinder, Physical Housing
Characteristics for Occupied Housing Units: 2012-2016 American Community Survey 5-Year Estimates (showing
that single-family detached structures account for 62.8% of all occupied residences in the United States as a whole,
but only 9.4% of New York City residences),
https://factfinder.census.gov/faces/tableservices/jsf/pages/productview.xhtml?pid=ACS_16_5YR_S2504&prodType
=table (last visited Apr. 19, 2018).

PRE-PUBLICATION DRAFT: Please cite from published version
many other regions.17 These complexities are well known among recovery and planning officials
in the region.
New York City’s Department of City Planning has enumerated these challenges in
multiple reports, guidebooks, and advisory documents, such as Designing for Flood Risk,
Retrofitting Buildings for Flood Risk, and Resilient Retail.18 As part of its remit, the Mayor’s
Office of Recovery and Resiliency continues to advocate for reform of these federal policies to
make them more reactive to on-the-ground situations in New York City and elsewhere. Other
municipalities in the region, such as Hoboken, New Jersey, have faced similar issues and have
also created resources to help property owners navigate the complexities of rebuilding and
mitigation in dense urban environments such as the city of Hoboken’s Cross-reference Guide to
Post-Sandy Resiliency Planning and Engineering and Resilient Building Design Guidelines.19
Another recovery challenge in the New York metro region is the cost of housing vis-à-vis
national averages. While federal relief funding caps do not vary by geography, costs do, and the
New York region’s construction costs are significantly higher than anywhere else in the world.20
Housing costs, not surprisingly, are also high. In New York City and the 11 coastal New York
and New Jersey counties most affected by Sandy, the median value of owner-occupied housing
units ranged from 1.26 to 2.77 times the national median of $178,600.21 Gross rent is also

17

See ULI FOUNDATION, AFTER SANDY: ADVANCING STRATEGIES FOR LONG-TERM RESILIENCE AND ADAPTABILITY
4 (2013), http://americas.uli.org/wp-content/uploads/sites/125/ULI-Documents/AfterSandy.pdf.
18

See NEW YORK CITY DEPARTMENT OF CITY PLANNING, COASTAL CLIMATE RESILIENCE: DESIGNING FOR FLOOD
RISK (2013) [hereinafter DESIGNING FOR FLOOD RISK],
http://www.sustainablenyct.org/news/NYCDCP_DESIGNING%20FOR%20FLOOD%20RISK_
DRAFT-LOW.pdf; RETROFITTING BUILDINGS FOR FLOOD RISK, supra note 16; NEW YORK CITY DEPARTMENT OF
CITY PLANNING, COASTAL CLIMATE RESILIENCY: RESILIENT RETAIL (2016) [hereinafter RESILIENT RETAIL],
http://www1.nyc.gov/assets/planning/download/pdf/plans-studies/resilient-retail/resilient-retail-full-report-2pager.pdf.
19

See CITY OF HOBOKEN, NEW JERSEY, CROSS-REFERENCE GUIDE TO POST-SANDY RESILIENCY PLANNING AND
ENGINEERING (2015) (copy on file with the authors); PRINCETON HYDRO, RESILIENT BUILDING DESIGN GUIDELINES
(2015), http://www.hobokennj.gov/docs/communitydev/Resilient-Buildings-Design-Guidelines.
20

See TURNER & TOWNSEND, INTERNATIONAL CONSTRUCTION MARKET SURVEY 2017, at 16-20, 84-85 (2017) (as of
2017, New York City’s construction costs have become the highest in the world, New York City has the second
highest cost of labor, and both of these costs are expected to continue their rise),
http://www.turnerandtownsend.com/media/2412/international-construction-market-survey-2017-final.pdf; compare
to Kathryn Brenzel, High Construction Wages, Material Costs, Make NYC the World’s Most Expensive to Build:
Report, REAL DEAL N.Y., May 17, 2017, https://therealdeal.com/2017/05/17/high-construction-wages-materialcosts-make-nyc-the-worlds-most-expensive-place-to-build-report/.
21

See U.S. Census Bureau, American FactFinder, Selected Housing Characteristics: 2011-2015 American
Community Survey 5-Year Estimates,

PRE-PUBLICATION DRAFT: Please cite from published version
universally higher in the region than the national median, from 1.12 times higher in Cape May
County, New Jersey, to 1.35 times in New York City, and fully 1.7 times higher in Nassau
County, New York. Table 1 summarizes these housing cost dynamics.

Table 1
New York Metro Region Cost of Housing*

Median value of
Geography

owner-occupied
housing 20112015 (in US$)

Ownership
costs
compared
to national
median

Median gross
rent 20112015 (in
US$)

Rental
costs
compared
to national
median

United States

178,600

—

928

—

New York City

494,800

+277%

1,255

+135%

Bergen County, NJ

441,100

+247%

1,348

+145%

Hudson County, NJ

335,300

+188%

1,214

+131%

Middlesex County, NJ

323,300

+181%

1,299

+140%

Monmouth County, NJ

385,100

+216%

1,238

+133%

Ocean County, NJ

262,700

+147%

1,322

+142%

Essex County, NJ

356,600

+200%

1,068

+115%

Union County, NJ

345,500

+193%

1,174

+127%

Atlantic County, NJ

225,600

+126%

1,047

+113%

Cape May County, NJ

299,700

+168%

1,038

+112%

Suffolk County, NY

375,100

+210%

1,544

+166%

https://factfinder.census.gov/faces/tableservices/jsf/pages/productview.xhtml?pid=ACS_15_5YR_DP04&prodType
=table (last visited Apr. 19, 2018).
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Nassau County, NY
*

446,400

+250%

1,578

+170%

U.S. Census Bureau, American FactFinder, Selected Housing Characteristics: 2011-2015 American Community

Survey 5-Year Estimates,
https://factfinder.census.gov/faces/tableservices/jsf/pages/productview.xhtml?pid=ACS_15_5YR_DP04&prodType
=table (last visited Apr. 19, 2018).

These steep housing costs hinder rebuilding and recovery because in many cases the cost
to replace existing homes, not to mention adding upgraded mitigation measures, is substantially
greater than the aid amounts available.22 Consider that National Flood Insurance Program (NFIP)
coverage is capped at $250,000 for residential structures and $500,000 for commercial
structures.23 While in many parts of the country that will pay to replace an entire home, in the
Sandy region it is often inadequate. Similarly, the Federal Emergency Management Agency’s
(FEMA’s) housing assistance (HA) aid through the Individuals and Households Program (IHP)
is intended to cover temporary housing costs during the post-disaster repair period, repair
damage to a primary residence, or help with the cost of replacing a primary residence. Benefits
are adjusted annually based on the U.S. Department of Labor Consumer Price Index, currently
capped at $34,000 as of October 1, 2017.24 But this amount provides much more purchasing
power in some parts of the country than others, as housing values in the Sandy region illustrate.
The federal Small Business Administration (SBA) also makes disaster recovery and postdisaster mitigation loans to eligible businesses, homeowners, and renters.25 Again, due to the
high labor and real estate costs in the Sandy region, federal maximums were often inadequate to
22

See Russ Zimmer, Out of Money? Four Options for Stuck Sandy Families, APP.COM, Aug. 20, 2015,
https://www.app.com/story/news/local/monmouth-county/sandy-recovery/2015/08/20/sandy-rehab-loans-homeconstruction/32044899/.
23

See HelpWithMyBank.gov, Answers About Flood Insurance, https://www.helpwithmybank.gov/getanswers/insurance/flood-insurance/faq-flood-insurance-18.html (last updated Sept. 2017).
24

See Notice of Maximum Amount of Assistance Under the Individuals and Households Program, 82 Fed. Reg.
47568 (Oct. 1, 2017).
25

See SBA, SBA DISASTER LOAN PROGRAM FREQUENTLY ASKED QUESTIONS (2017),
https://www.sba.gov/sites/default/files/articles/sba-disaster-loans-faq.pdf.
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address recovery needs.26 Low-income renters and senior citizens were also overrepresented in
the populations of Sandy-affected areas, and more than 1,800 owners in the inundation area in
New York City alone were already in the mortgage foreclosure process before Sandy. These
vulnerable households thus faced additional recovery pressures, including a lack of discretionary
income available to finance recovery and inability to find new affordable housing options in the
region’s expensive and constrained housing market.27
In New York City in particular, temporary housing constraints were even more
pronounced. Though 64.2% of the city’s 3,400,093 housing units are rentals, the city’s 2014
Housing and Vacancy Survey found a citywide rental vacancy rate of just 3.45%, and had
reported even fewer vacancies (3.12%) in its 2011 survey.28 These numbers are far below the
national vacancy average, which was 11.4% in 2010.29 Only 16.5% of city residents live in
single-family homes.30 Most residents are apartment dwellers, and have little if any extra space
to house displaced friends or relatives for any significant amount of time. The city also has few
locations in which to site temporary housing (e.g., FEMA trailers).31 These factors combined to
make it extremely challenging, but absolutely essential, to develop innovative ways to get
residents back in their own homes as quickly as possible.
II.

A Brief History of Federal Disaster Recovery Law and Policy Leading Up to
Hurricane Sandy

Federal involvement in response to specific disaster events extends almost as far back as the
nation’s founding. More recent, however, is the federal government’s role in creating programs
that could be deployed nationwide to support local response and recovery efforts. The evolution
of these federal programs has progressed piecemeal, generally tracking the particular response
26

See Brenzel, supra note 20.

See FURMAN CENTER FOR REAL ESTATE AND URBAN POLICY, SANDY’S EFFECTS ON HOUSING IN NEW YORK CITY
(2013), available at http://furmancenter.org/files/publications/SandysEffectsOnHousingInNYC.pdf.
27

28

See ELYZABETH GAUMER & SHEREE WEST, NEW YORK CITY DEPARTMENT OF HOUSING AND PRESERVATION AND
DEVELOPMENT, SELECTED INITIAL FINDINGS OF THE 2014 NEW YORK CITY HOUSING AND VACANCY SURVEY 1-2, 11
(2015), http://www1.nyc.gov/assets/hpd/downloads/pdf/2014-HVS-initial-Findings.pdf.
29

See U.S. Census Bureau, American FactFinder, General Housing Characteristics: 2010 Census Summary File,
https://factfinder.census.gov/faces/tableservices/jsf/pages/productview.xhtml?pid=DEC_10_SF1_QTH1&prodType
=table (last visited Apr. 19, 2018).
30
31

U.S. Census Bureau, supra note 16.

See Cindy Rodriguez, FEMA Says No to Trailers in New York City, WNYC, Dec. 6, 2012,
https://www.wnyc.org/story/255683-no-fema-trailers-new-york-city/.
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and recovery challenges presented by successive natural disasters. To understand notable gaps in
federal recovery programs in place when Superstorm Sandy hit the region in October 2012, it is
important to appreciate the challenges associated with the federal government’s effort to build a
set of comprehensive disaster recovery programs.
The story of federal disaster policy begins not long after the nation’s founding. In late
1802, Portsmouth, New Hampshire, suffered a series of fires known as the Great Portsmouth
Parade Fire. One hundred thirty-two buildings burned, devastating the city. Because of the
importance of the busy port and related shipbuilding industry, the fledgling U.S. Congress passed
the first federal disaster aid bill on January 14, 1803, a Bill for the Relief of Sufferers of Fire in
the Town of Portsmouth, authorizing the city to cancel all of its old bonds and issue new bonds
to finance rebuilding. Over the next 147 years, Congress followed a practice of largely ad hoc
response, passing 128 more bills to facilitate local disaster recovery after specific events. 32
The first concerted attempt to systematize the federal role in recovery did not come until the
Disaster Relief Act of 1950, which established some of the basic concepts that inform federal
disaster response to this day.33
Many other components of today’s federal recovery infrastructure also date to the 1950s
and 1960s. Under President Dwight D. Eisenhower, the Small Business Act of 1953 created the
SBA, building on earlier precedents including the Reconstruction Finance Corporation and the
U.S. Department of Commerce’s Office of Small Business.34 In addition to assisting small
businesses in normal times, the SBA also provided recovery loans to disaster-impacted
businesses and homeowners and continues to be an important recovery resource today.35 The
1964 Amendments to the Alaska Omnibus Act36 authorized the federal Housing and Home
Finance Agency administrator to provide up to $25,000,000 in direct grant funding for urban
renewal projects to help local communities rebuild after Alaska’s March 1964 “Good Friday”
earthquake. The Alaska Act established the precedent for using direct block grant programs for

32

See REBECCA KATZ, ESSENTIALS OF PUBLIC HEALTH PREPAREDNESS 47-48 (1st ed. 2013).

33

See Federal Disaster Relief Act of 1950, Pub. L. No. 81-875, 64 Stat. 1109-11.

34

See Pub. L. No. 83-163, 67 Stat. 230 (1953).

35

See Keith Bea, The Formative Years: 1950-1978, in EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT: THE AMERICAN EXPERIENCE
1900-2010, at 81, 87 (Claire B. Rubin ed., Routledge 2012).
36

See Pub. L. No. 88-451, 78 Stat. 505 (1964).
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disaster relief that would later evolve into the Department of Housing and Urban Development’s
(HUD’s) Community Development Block Grant Disaster Recovery (CDBG-DR) Program.
Another pillar of modern federal disaster policy emerged in 1968 with the creation of the
NFIP, a critical piece of the country’s flood-related mitigation and recovery framework.37 The
NFIP was created through the National Flood Insurance Act of 1968, though it was 40 years in
the making.38 The private insurance industry ceased covering flood losses after the Great
Mississippi River Flood of 1927.39 President Harry S. Truman later advocated for a national
flood insurance program after the Great Flood of 1951 caused extensive losses in Kansas and
Truman’s native Missouri. Truman’s successor, President Eisenhower, eventually oversaw
passage of the Federal Flood Insurance Act of 1956, which included federal flood insurance,
reinsurance, and disaster loan programs.40 The impacts of Hurricane Betsy in 1965, and previous
storms in the southern United States in 1963 and 1964, finally prompted the federal government
to create and fund the NFIP through Title XIII of the Housing and Urban Development Act of
1968.41
The destruction caused by Hurricane Camille and 28 other major disasters that occurred
in 1969 led to increased federal spending on disaster relief and recovery.42 This prompted
President Richard Nixon to issue the April 22, 1970, Special Message to Congress on Federal
Disaster Assistance. This Message advocated a more aggressive federal approach to all aspects

37

See FEDERAL INSURANCE AND MITIGATION ADMINISTRATION, FEMA, NATIONAL FLOOD INSURANCE PROGRAM
FACT SHEET (2016) [hereinafter NATIONAL FLOOD INSURANCE PROGRAM FACT SHEET],
https://www.fema.gov/media-library-data/1464700430600-c4b174ccadfea6b6a121acaeb06097a6/National-FloodInsurance-Program-Fact-Sheet-May-2016r.pdf.
38

See Pub. L. No. 90-448, 82 Stat. 476 (1968); AMERICAN INSTITUTES FOR RESEARCH ET AL., A CHRONOLOGY OF
MAJOR EVENTS AFFECTING THE NATIONAL FLOOD INSURANCE PROGRAM 3-12 (2002) (detailing how various flood
control measures, and the government’s support of them, evolved from 1917 until the founding of the NFIP in
1968), available at https:// https://www.fema.gov/media-library-data/20130726-1602-204907283/nfip_eval_chronology.pdf
39

See AMERICAN INSTITUTES FOR RESEARCH ET AL., supra note 38, at 3.

40

See Pub. L. No. 84-1016, 70 Stat. 1078 (1956).

41

See Pub. L. No. 90-448, 82 Stat. 476 (1986). The National Flood Insurance Act of 1968 established the NFIP and
Federal Insurance Administration, both then housed within HUD to provide federal flood insurance to property
owners in communities where local governments undertake voluntary flood mitigation and enact floodplain
management ordinances.
42

See David Moss, Courting Disaster? The Transformation of Federal Disaster Policy Since 1803, in THE
FINANCING OF CATASTROPHE RISK 307, 317 (Kenneth A. Froot ed., University of Chicago Press 1999).
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of disaster management.43 In response, Congress passed the 1970 Disaster Relief Act and
amendments in 1974. The Act attempted to unify the disparate existing federal disaster-related
programs. It added a new emphasis on assistance for individuals, thus continuing a policy shift
away from long-standing expectations that neighbors and philanthropies were responsible for
household-level relief, loosened restrictions on the repair of municipal facilities, and further
emphasized funding of mitigation as a federal priority.44
Together, passage of the National Flood Insurance Act and the 1970 Disaster Relief Act
and its 1974 amendments created a more integrated—though still not completely streamlined—
federal disaster recovery system. President Nixon continued to promote this integrated approach
through Presidential Reorganization Plan No. 1 of 1973, which eliminated the Presidential Office
of Emergency Preparedness and consolidated federal disaster relief and recovery efforts in the
newly created Federal Disaster Assistance Administration (FDAA) within HUD.45 Five years
later, FEMA was created by President Jimmy Carter via Presidential Reorganization Plan No. 3
of 1978 and implemented through Executive Order Nos. 12127 and 12148 in an attempt to
consolidate disaster-related functions in one agency.46 Previously, these responsibilities had been
divided among a broad range of federal entities, including the Defense Civil Preparedness
Agency, the U.S. Department of Defense, the FDAA, HUD, the Department of Commerce, the
Federal Preparedness Agency, the General Services Administration, and the Office of Science
and Technology Policy.
In 2002, FEMA ceased to be an independent federal agency and was integrated into the
newly formed U.S. Department of Homeland Security.47 The role of FEMA and other federal
agencies related to disaster mitigation, response, and recovery is currently defined by the 1998
Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act.48 The Stafford Act mandates
that federal assistance supplement local and state efforts once exhausted, and it requires states
See President’s Special Message to Congress on Federal Disaster Assistance, 1 PUB. PAPERS 379-84 (Apr. 22,
1970).
43

44

See Moss, supra note 42, at 317, 331; Disaster Relief Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-606, 84 Stat. 1744; Disaster
Relief Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-288, 88 Stat. 143.
45

See Presidential Reorganization Plan No. 1 of 1973, 38 Fed. Reg. 1089 (July 1, 1973).

46

See Presidential Reorganization Plan No. 3 of 1978, 43 Fed. Reg. 41943; Exec. Order No. 12127, 44 Fed. Reg.
19367 (Mar. 31, 1979); Exec. Order No. 12148, 44 Fed. Reg. 43239 (July 20, 1979).
47

See Homeland Security Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-296, 116 Stat. 2135.

48

See Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act, 42 U.S.C. §§5121-5207.
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(through their governors) to explicitly request federal assistance for response and recovery. 49 The
Act also places a heavy emphasis on coordination, and it illustrates the most aggressive
government role to date in promoting pre-disaster planning and mitigation, in addition to postevent relief and recovery.
In the several years leading up to Superstorm Sandy, a string of major disasters hit
communities from the Gulf Coast to the Midwest to the Northeast. These events, which included
Hurricanes Katrina, Rita, and Wilma in 2005, Hurricanes Gustav and Ike and the Iowa floods in
2008, and then Tropical Storm Irene in 2011, focused intense criticism on the federal
government’s coordination and leadership of recovery efforts. The Post-Katrina Emergency
Management Reform Act amended the Stafford Act in 2006, requiring the creation of a National
Disaster Recovery Strategy and National Disaster Housing Strategy to further delineate the
disaster recovery responsibilities of federal agencies.50
In 2011, less than a year before Sandy, the federal government issued its National
Disaster Recovery Framework (NDRF), a new blueprint for more efficient and streamlined
disaster recoveries.51 The NDRF represented the federal government’s effort to improve local,
state, and federal coordination along the entire continuum of planning and response, from predisaster planning to the short-term, mid-term, and long-term recovery periods following a
disaster.52 It urges governments to begin preparing for a disaster event long before the event
occurs by envisioning what the city or county would like recovery to look like. These
preparations include anticipating possible post-disaster stressors, such as a local government’s
lack of staff and its ability to coordinate with nongovernmental organizations to achieve longterm recovery goals.53
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Id. §5170.

50

See 6 U.S.C. §§771-772; Robert B. Olshansky & Laurie A. Johnson, The Evolution of the Federal Role in
Supporting Community Recovery After U.S. Disasters 80 J. AM. PLAN. ASS’N 293, 299 (2015).
51

See FEMA, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY, NATIONAL DISASTER RECOVERY FRAMEWORK (2011)
[hereinafter NDRF], https://www.fema.gov/pdf/recoveryframework/ndrf.pdf. Because the first edition of the NDRF
was in place both during Sandy and the immediate aftermath, it is referenced here rather than the second edition that
was released in 2016. The current version of the NDRF is available at https://www.fema.gov/media-librarydata/1466014998123-4bec8550930f774269e0c5968b120ba2/National_Disaster_Recovery_Framework2nd.pdf.
52

See NDRF, supra note 51, at 8.

53

Id. at 13-17.
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The passage of the NDRF also means that federal, state, tribal, and local governments, as
well as business and nongovernmental organizations, understand that they each have particular
spheres of responsibility in helping communities recover.54 Finalized more than a year before
Sandy, the NDRF’s observation concerning the vulnerability of urban centers is prescient. But
the NDRF’s discussion of a densely settled urban community’s vulnerability amounts to a brief
paragraph.55 It does not flag the types of challenges local governments may encounter in carrying
out major disaster response and recovery in a densely settled urban setting.
As this history illustrates, decisions about the structure of the nation’s disaster response
and recovery programs have been informed by lessons learned from each previous disaster,
involving constant and ongoing refinements. At the same time, the system is a product of politics
and ongoing debates about the role the federal government should play in helping communities
mitigate disaster risk and/or recover from disasters. Moreover, responsibilities for various
aspects of recovery continue to be spread across multiple federal agencies and distributed among
municipalities, states, and the federal government. This situation is neither inherently good nor
bad, but it does mean that the nation’s approach to disaster response and recovery is, and will
remain, complex and constantly evolving. The lessons provided by Sandy provide yet another
opportunity to further refine federal, state, and local recovery policies.

III. Current Federal Tools for Disaster Mitigation and Recovery
The preceding history of federal involvement in disaster recovery reveals the complex genealogy
and orphan provenance of federal recovery efforts. This history also helps explain how so many
different federal agencies have come to be involved in recovery, ranging from FEMA and HUD
54

See id. at 19-24. The NDRF prescribes specific leadership positions that it expects local, state, and tribal
organizations to fill prior to disaster events and then serve as critical points of contact for carrying out disaster
response programming. Id. at 25-35. These local, state, and tribal leadership positions do not displace existing local,
state, and tribal leadership positions, but are meant to encourage complementing them with qualified professionals
and ensure that there are local and state coordinating officers to work with the federal disaster recovery coordinator.
Id. at 25, 34.
55

Despite all of the attention to pre-event planning, coordination, and evaluation, it is important to highlight that
completing an assessment of existing laws and policies related to recovery received only general treatment in the
NDRF’s initial iteration. The NDRF version in circulation in October 2012 advised local governments to review
existing planning documents, but its pre-disaster planning guidelines did not specifically suggest a broader need to
look at local or state laws relating to housing and community development. These laws might include building
codes, code enforcement ordinances, or zoning codes. The NDRF did, however, specifically note that densely settled
urban communities deserve special consideration in disaster planning because they are especially at risk to problems
surrounding disaster response and recovery.
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to the SBA and U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (the Corps), and it illustrates, in part, why the
recovery process is so dauntingly complicated.
This section describes the array of federal programs that were in place when the state of
New Jersey, the state of New York, and New York City began to rebuild following Superstorm
Sandy. As this description makes evident, state and local governments faced an enormous
challenge in deploying direct response aid in the days after the storm. At the same time that New
Jersey, New York, and New York City were supplying immediate life-saving assistance, they
were also already beginning to design and staff multibillion-dollar long-term recovery delivery
systems that could effectively interface with federal programs. Simultaneously, they were
crafting new relationships with key federal agencies and learning how to navigate the
complicated requirements of several relatively distinct federal programs. The challenges facing
individuals were perhaps just as great. State and local governments and affected families and
businesses learned quickly that their path to recovery would involve a long and difficult process
of “wading through federal alphabet soup,” as described by Holly Leicht,56 who was regional
administrator for HUD’s Region II at the time of Sandy.
The federal government’s current role in long-term recovery is largely financial and
legal. While the federal government provides significant technical assistance, it is the state and
local governments that decide how recovery and rebuilding will occur, using a significant
amount of federal money and working within the parameters established by Congress and federal
agencies.57 This section outlines the sources of funding that figure critically in state and local
government recovery choices. First, we examine FEMA’s post-disaster assistance, hazard
mitigation, and insurance programs, then we describe the SBA post-disaster loan program and
conclude with a review of HUD’s long-term disaster recovery and resilience programs.

A.

FEMA’s Post-disaster Assistance Programs

Following a presidentially declared major disaster, FEMA wears at least three hats: furnishing
individual recovery assistance to affected homeowners, providing public assistance to local and
state governments to rebuild public facilities and infrastructure, and making available a tranche
See HOLLY M. LEICHT, REBUILD THE PLANE NOW: RECOMMENDATIONS FOR IMPROVING GOVERNMENT’S
APPROACH TO DISASTER RECOVERY AND PREPAREDNESS 4 (2017), http://communityp.com/wpcontent/uploads/2017/07/IMPROVING-DISASTER-RECOVERY-PAPER-FINAL.pdf.
56
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See 42 U.S.C. §5195.
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of hazard mitigation funds to disaster-affected state and federally recognized tribal governments.
FEMA uses four programs to carry out its responsibilities.
1. FEMA’s IHP
FEMA’s IHP assists residents whose primary residence has been affected by a disaster.58 The
amount of assistance is limited and adjusted annually (currently $33,000). The IHP is designed to
be a relief mechanism of last resort. FEMA expects those with minor housing damage, shortterm shelter needs, and/or financial or other resources such as insurance to address their own
needs without IHP assistance. The program is intended to address serious and immediate needs
for shelter and related needs, but not to reconstruct homes to a pre-event condition. An applicant
must be a U.S. citizen, legal permanent resident, or qualified alien.
2. FEMA’s Hazard Mitigation Grant Program (HMGP)
A post-disaster landscape usually yields strong clues regarding the changes communities should
consider making to avoid future injuries, deaths, and repetitive losses. Choosing to rebuild a city
in a manner resilient to floods, earthquakes, or tidal surges is expensive and often beyond the
reach of local governments. Federal assistance is critical to help pay for the costs of elevating
structures, strengthening them to seismic stressors, or buying out homeowners living in the most
vulnerable locations. FEMA’s HMGP59 provides funding specifically devoted to helping
communities and their residents build back in a manner that prevents future loss of life and

58

IHP financial housing assistance is directly provided to affected residents to fund housing-related needs such as
securing temporary housing or repairing critical components of a primary residence in order to make it habitable.
Direct housing assistance is also available when affected residents are unable to use financial assistance, such as
when there is no available short-term or long-term rental housing available.
59

It is important to note that the HMGP is not the only FEMA hazard mitigation program nor is FEMA the only
federal agency that funds hazard mitigation projects. Under its post-disaster Public Assistance Program, FEMA
supports hazard mitigation in rebuilding projects associated with public assistance investments, such as
improvements that make a local government’s buildings resistant to flooding. This public-sector infrastructure
mitigation project is authorized by §406 of the Stafford Act. See Hearing Before the House Subcommittee on
Emergency Preparedness, Response, and Communications of the Committee on Homeland Security, 114th Cong. 15
(2016) (testimony of Michael Byrne, Deputy Regional Administrator, Region II, FEMA). HUD has also authorized
local and state governments to use CDBG-DR funds for hazard mitigation purposes, such as HUD’s $900 million
post-Sandy investment in flood mitigation projects in both New York and New Jersey. See Hearing Before the
House Subcommittee on Emergency Preparedness, Response, and Communications of the Committee on Homeland
Security, 114th Cong. 20 (2016) (testimony of Marion Mollegen McFadden, Deputy Assistant Secretary, HUD).
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property when the hazard recurs.60 FEMA reviews state HMGP applications looking for projects
that fulfill a range of criteria.61 The project must save lives and property well into the future
when the community is threatened by similar hazards.62 If FEMA funds the proposed project, the
state must supply 25% of the project’s funding. The states then make the awarded funds
available to subapplicants—the homeowners, local governments, and nonprofits working in the
disaster area.
New York and New Jersey deployed their allocations of HMGP funds both to assist
individuals and to pay for improvements to public infrastructure potentially vulnerable to future
flooding events. New York’s Bridge Scour Program focused on upgrades to more than 100
bridges in 78 different local jurisdictions.63 The state’s remaining HMGP money was allocated to
projects aimed at making infrastructure more resilient to natural hazards as well as to restoring
natural landscapes that could play an important role in protecting communities from future
flooding events.64 New Jersey devoted a significant portion of its HMGP dollars to helping
homeowners elevate their homes65 or sell their homes for use as greenspace to help mitigate
future losses due to flooding.66
3. FEMA’s NFIP
Administered by FEMA, the NFIP is typically thought of as a source of financial assistance to
homeowners affected by floodwaters, providing federally backed and subsidized flood insurance.
In actuality, the program has a second rationale, which is to reduce the overall exposure to flood-

60

See FEMA, Hazard Mitigation Grant Program, https://www.fema.gov/hazard-mitigation-grant-program (last
updated June 8, 2017).
61

Id. (Benefits of HMPG).
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Id.

See GOVERNOR’S OFFICE OF STORM RECOVERY, NY RISING: 2012-2015 at 16 (2015) (reviewing housing, small
business, community, and infrastructure recovery projects funded by the New York Governor’s Office in the wake
of Hurricane Sandy), https://www.governor.ny.gov/sites/governor.ny.gov/files/atoms/files/GOSRreport102915.pdf.
63
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Id. at 14-18.
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See News Release, State of New Jersey Department of Environmental Protection, Christie Administration
Announces Approval of First Sandy Elevation Grants From Department of Environmental Protection’s HMGP
Elevation Program (Apr. 4, 2014) (New Jersey committed $100 million in HMGP funds to help homeowners elevate
their homes), http://www.nj.gov/dep/newsrel/2014/14_0023.htm.
66

See NEW JERSEY DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION, SUPERSTORM SANDY BLUE ACRES BUYOUT
PROGRAM—FREQUENTLY ASKED QUESTIONS (2015), http://www.nj.gov/dep/greenacres/pdf/faqs-blueacres.pdf.
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related risks by facilitating effective floodplain management.67 A third component of the NFIP is
floodplain mapping and risk assessment.68 We focus here only on the post-disaster assistance
portion of the program, but other aspects of the NFIP will be discussed in subsequent sections.
To be eligible for NFIP coverage, a residential property owner, renter, or business owner
must be located in one of the more than 22,000 jurisdictions that participate in the NFIP.69
Participating communities are required to implement FEMA-approved floodplain management
ordinances aimed at reducing the risk of flooding.70 Flood insurance is optional for residents and
business owners in both high- and low-risk areas of a participating community, though it is
mandatory for structures located in high-risk zones (special flood hazard areas, or SFHAs) that
currently carry a mortgage or other loan from a federally insured lender or the SBA.71 Failure to
maintain this mandatory coverage can also preclude a property owner from receiving additional
SBA loans.72 In 2016, there were more than 5.1 million existing NFIP policies totaling more than
$1.25 trillion in coverage, while paid claims averaged more than $31,000.73

4. FEMA Public Assistance (PA) Program
FEMA’s PA Program provides funds for states, municipalities, tribal governments, and some
nonprofit organizations providing essential services, like medical care, education, or utility
supply, to cover short-term response and long-term recovery from presidentially declared

67

See DIANE P. HORN & JARED T. BROWN, CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE, INTRODUCTION TO THE NATIONAL
FLOOD INSURANCE PROGRAM (NFIP) 2 (2017), https://fas.org/sgp/crs/homesec/R44593.pdf.
68

See FEMA, National Flood Insurance Program: Flood Hazard Mapping, https://www.fema.gov/national-floodinsurance-program-flood-hazard-mapping (last updated Apr. 16, 2018).
69

See FEMA, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY, FLOOD INSURANCE 101: TALKING POINTS FOR
COMMUNITY OFFICIALS (2012), https://www.fema.gov/media-library-data/14278084959791d43a43f7ed24e65171793481bcfc79e/Flood_Insurance_101_TPs_03_2015.pdf.
70

See FEMA, Participation in the National Flood Insurance Program (communities are required to have flood
management ordinances that meet or exceed NFIP criteria), https://www.fema.gov/participation-national-floodinsurance-program (last updated Dec. 13, 2017).
71

See FEDERAL INSURANCE AND MITIGATION ADMINISTRATION, FEMA—NATIONAL FLOOD INSURANCE PROGRAM:
A HOMEBUYERS’ GUIDE (2016), https://www.fema.gov/media-library-data/14646957395747e3648887255b0d9fa98767d8406115e/NFIP-Fact-Sheet-A-Home-Buyers-Guide-May-2016r.pdf.
72

See News Release, FEMA, Flood Insurance: Good Financial Sense Now Affects Disaster Assistance Later (Jan. 3,
2018), https://www.fema.gov/pt-br/node/326758.
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See NATIONAL FLOOD INSURANCE PROGRAM FACT SHEET, supra note 37.
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disasters.74 PA funds can be used for emergency work, such as debris removal, as well as
emergency protective measures like demolition of damaged structures. In addition, they can
provide temporary community facilities.75 Permanent work eligible for PA funding can include
construction of infrastructure and facilities such as roads, bridges, utilities, parks, and public
buildings.76

5. SBA Disaster Loan Program
SBA loan programs are designed to help residents and businesses recover by providing funding
to assist with uninsured losses. The SBA Disaster Loan Program has three components. Home
disaster loans are available to homeowners to repair or replace real estate damaged by a disaster
up to a maximum of $200,000.77 Homeowners and residential renters may borrow up to $40,000
to replace lost or damaged personal property such as home contents and automobiles.78 Business
physical disaster loans are available in amounts not to exceed $2,000,000 to help businesses
(including nonprofits, churches, and private universities) repair or replace property such as
buildings, supplies, and equipment.79 Economic injury disaster loans are loans of last resort to
help small businesses meet financial obligations that result from a disaster.80 Mitigation loans
may also be available to fund efforts that will protect against damage from future events.81
SBA loans come with many stipulations. Second homes and property such as recreational
vehicles and pleasure boats are ineligible, items such as antiques are valued only at their
functional value, and exterior components of homes (e.g., swimming pools or decorative
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See FEMA, Public Assistance: Local, State, Tribal, and Private Non-profit, https://www.fema.gov/publicassistance-local-state-tribal-and-non-profit (last updated Sept. 14, 2017).
75

Id.

76

See FEMA, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY, PUBLIC ASSISTANCE FACT SHEET (2017),
https://www.fema.gov/media-library-data/1497559657642a01f6ee60e25394fa9a25cae2fd289d5/PublicAssistanceFactSheetJune2017.pdf.
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See SBA, supra note 24, at 3.
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landscaping) are eligible for only limited coverage.82 SBA loans may also be used to refinance
home and business mortgages or to pay for relocation, subject to SBA guidelines.83

6. HUD’s CDBG-DR
Along with FEMA and SBA funds, HUD’s CDBG-DR funding constitutes one of the three
major sources of federal disaster recovery funding.84 CDBG-DR grant funds have become an
increasingly important source of funds to help fuel affected communities’ major post-disaster
long-term recovery projects, with Congress and HUD having used CDBG-DR to help fund
recovery from 18 different disasters before Sandy, totaling $31,887,000,000 in aid.85 By law,
70% of a state’s or city’s CDBG-DR award must benefit low- and moderate-income families.86
HUD defines low-income as individuals and families earning less than 80% of the area median
income.87 For example, in 2017, this would mean that post-disaster CDBG-DR funds are targeted
to the needs of a New York City family of four earning $76,320 or less.88 Despite these
constraints, CDBG-DR is generally considered the most flexible source of funding for disaster
recovery projects89 in contrast to FEMA and SBA sources.
CDBG-DR allocations funded a range of state and local programs. New York state and
New Jersey used these funds to create state-run programs to help Sandy-impacted homeowners
82

See id. at 3.

See SBA, U.S. SMALL BUSINESS ADMINISTRATION DISASTER LOANS—FACT SHEET,
https://www.sba.gov/sites/default/files/Concord%20Disaster%20Loan%20Fact%20Sheets.pdf.
83
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See EUGENE BOYD, CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE, COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT BLOCK GRANT FUNDS IN
DISASTER RELIEF AND RECOVERY 1 (2011), https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/RL33330.pdf.
85

See Kevin F. Gotham, Reinforcing Inequalities: The Impact of the CDBG Program on Post-Katrina Rebuilding,
24 HOUSING POL’Y DEBATE 192 (2014).
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See BOYD, supra note 84.
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See OFFICE OF POLICY DEVELOPMENT AND RESEARCH, HUD, FY 2017 HUD INCOME LIMITS BRIEFING MATERIAL
1 (2017) (“Area Median Income is calculated annually by HUD for each urbanized area in the country based on date
from the Census Bureau’s American Community Survey”), available at
https://www.huduser.gov/portal/datasets/il//il17/IncomeLimitsBriefingMaterial-FY17.pdf.
88

See NYC Housing Preservation & Development, Affordable Housing—Area Median Income (AMI),
http://www1.nyc.gov/site/hpd/renters/what-is-affordable-housing.page (last visited Apr. 19, 2018).
89

See, e.g., Texas Rebuilds, The Long-term Road to Recovery, http://www.texasrebuilds.org/Pages/AboutCDBGDR.aspx (last visited Apr. 19, 2018); Jenny Hsu, What to Know About the CDBG Disaster Recovery Program,
NAHRO BLOG, Oct. 5, 2017, https://nahroblog.org/2017/10/05/what-to-know-about-the-cdbg-disaster-recoveryprogram/; Marion M. McFadden, Senate Includes Long-term Recovery Funds in Hurricane Aid Package,
ENTERPRISE COMMUNITY PARTNERS, Sept. 7, 2017, https://www.enterprise
community.org/blog/2017/09/senate-includes-long-term-recovery-funds-hurricane-aid-package.
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rebuild their homes.90 New York state earmarked CDBG-DR funds to “buy out” homeowners
living in vulnerable locations near the water.91 New Jersey used CDBG-DR funds to pay for
housing, economic development programs, and infrastructure restoration. New York City used
its $4.21 billion in CDBG-DR funds to address infrastructure, housing restoration, and housing
and economic revitalization.92
Over six decades, in response to a variety of disasters in varied contexts, the federal
government assembled this suite of FEMA, SBA, and HUD programs as the core of its recovery
assistance strategy. These programs have been the principal funding source for the Sandy
region’s major programs for response to, and recovery from, the storm’s devastation. As detailed
in Section IV, these federal programs have supported state and local implementation of
initiatives tailored to the needs of local communities.

IV. The Superstorm Sandy Recovery and the State and City Implementation of Federal
Disaster Recovery Programs
Disasters on the scale of Sandy are rare. But they are not without precedent. In the past 25 years,
Hurricane Andrew, the Northridge earthquake, Hurricane Katrina, and the 2008 Iowa floods had major
impacts on midsize and large U.S. cities. In the summer of 2017, Hurricane Harvey drowned Houston and
Hurricane Maria shredded San Juan’s buildings and infrastructure. However, rarely has a disaster
devastated a region as densely settled as New York, with its particular mix of sociodemographic
characteristics, land use patterns, building types, forms of home ownership, cost of living, and other
complicating factors.93 It became clear relatively quickly in many parts of New Jersey, New York state,
and New York City that federal recovery programs designed to respond to prior disasters were not
90
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calibrated for the realities of much of the Sandy region. To address the federal recovery programs’ poor
fit, state and local governments acted quickly to create a number of programs designed specifically to deal
with local contexts, using the existing, though sometimes limited, flexibility built into federal programs to
tailor recovery strategies to the needs of local communities.

A. The New York City Rapid Repairs and Build It Back Programs
New York City crafted two ambitious housing recovery programs to address the immediate and
longer-term housing repair and rebuilding needs created by Sandy. The Interim Assistance Rapid
Repairs Program (Rapid Repairs) was the city’s attempt to fill storm-impacted residents’
desperate need for housing in the weeks immediately following the storm.94 The city’s Build It
Back Program aided homeowners who needed to engage in a range of recovery activities from
repair, to rebuilding, to sale of their storm-damaged home to the government.95 Each program
was remarkable in its scope and reach, aiding tens of thousands of New York City residents.96
But the programs were novel and created under intense time pressure. As a result, program
rollouts encountered problems. City residents and regulators alike criticized both programs for
shortcomings in design and implementation.
In Sandy’s immediate wake, thousands of New York City residents were left with
damaged homes that, even if structurally sound, lacked power, heat, or hot water. Aware that
freezing temperatures were possible at any time during the late fall and winter months of 2012
and 2013, the city moved immediately to protect citizens by repairing these essential home
systems.97 Identifying quick, safe, and cost-effective post-disaster housing has long been a
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vexing challenge for local and state governments.98 In prior disasters, state and local
governments have often received FEMA trailers to house affected residents.99 No such solution
would work in New York City where there are few large lots on which to house multiple trailers
and, for individual families, little or no yard space on which to park a single trailer.100 A tight
rental market and other factors (as discussed in Section I) created additional challenges.
Given the urgency of approaching winter weather and these specific local constraints, the
city was compelled to develop its own locally tailored short-term housing program quickly.
Rapid Repairs was a modified application of FEMA’s post-Sandy Sheltering and Temporary
Essential Power Pilot Program designed to assist residents with restoring essential housing
components such as windows, doors, and utilities. The program allowed residents to remain in
their homes during long-term reconstruction and thereby reduced the need for off-site shelters
and temporary housing.101 In a departure from precedents established after previous disasters, the
city retained large construction contractors directly, deploying them on applicants’ behalf.
Between November 2012 and the end of March 2013, the program repaired 11,800 structures,
which included a total of 20,000 housing units.102 As result, thousands of individuals and
families were able to quickly return to or stay in their homes. These families were also remaining
much closer to their jobs, schools, churches, and other important community resources, thus
contributing to family and overall community recovery. FEMA’s PA Grant Program paid for
90% of the Rapid Repairs Program’s $97 million price tag.103 The remaining 10% of the program
costs were covered by HUD CDBG-DR funds.104
Rapid Repairs’ highly innovative approach was not without criticism. Contractors
retained by the city to perform emergency repairs noted that they waited months for final
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payment, meaning that private firms effectively helped finance the public program.105 HUD’s
inspector general criticized the city for careless program administration decisions, including the
city’s erroneous payment of $18.2 million in state sales tax on program-related repairs and
services, even though the city was supposedly exempt from such taxes.106 Further, some
homeowners complained of poor work, including electricians that left exposed wires and hot
water heaters and boilers that were improperly installed.107
Rapid Repairs was an emergency effort to stabilize damaged properties, but not all
necessary repairs could be completed in the first several months following the storm.108 The
city’s Build It Back Program was designed to support the second stage of recovery, which
included more substantial rehabilitation or reconstruction of homes and residential rental
buildings as well as support for very low-income renters.109 Once again, New York City did not
have a reliable template for this program. Just as the federal government had a frustrating preSandy track record for carrying out emergency disaster recovery programs, state and local
governments have historically experienced significant challenges designing and administering
long-term housing recovery programs.110
New York City was determined to avoid that fate. It designed Build It Back specifically
to overcome the post-Katrina legacy of contractors who performed shoddy work, contractors
who defrauded homeowners, and homeowners who spent their rebuilding funds to pay for
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expenses completely unrelated to rebuilding.111 Sandy-impacted property owners had the option
of using city-approved contractors or selecting their own contractor. Though reimbursement was
also available for smaller repairs, Build It Back was designed to make payments directly to
contractors for the most significant repairs as well as resiliency efforts such as housing
elevation.112
Funded by federal CDBG-DR grant monies appropriated as part of the January 2013
Sandy Recovery Improvement Act, Build It Back ultimately established three strategies for
revitalizing storm-impacted neighborhoods. Those strategies included a program to aid singlefamily homeowners who owned residences with up to four units; a multifamily property
rebuilding program for structures supporting five or more housing units; and a comparatively
small rental assistance program for very low-income renters.113 The single-family program for
buildings with one to four units initially offered those owners three options: repair, repair with
elevation of the damaged structure, or rebuild.114 In 2014, the program added two more options
for single-family program participants: reimbursement for participants’ storm repairs completed
prior to their enrollment in Build It Back and, in limited instances, a government buyout of the
storm-damaged property, which would allow the homeowner to relocate.115 As of October 2017,
Build It Back had served 8,207 properties containing more than 12,500 housing units, with 7,217
projects already completed.116
The design of Build It Back was significantly influenced by HUD regulations specifying
the income of individuals that the federal government prioritized for post-disaster aid. Strict
federal guidelines required that CDBG-DR grant funds primarily benefit low- and moderateincome families.117 Under applicable HUD CDBG regulations, this meant that the Build It Back
Program was required to spend at least 50% of its funding on families earning 80% or less of the
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New York City area median income, which in April 2014 was a family of four earning $68,700
annually.118
Creating and managing a post-storm redevelopment program that manages repairs for
thousands of private homeowners is an enormous undertaking, unprecedented for any private
developer, much less for a public entity, such as a city. Initially budgeted in 2013 for $1.45
billion, by 2016, the Build It Back Program’s obligations had surged more than 33% over
budget.119 The program also suffered from lengthy delays in beginning work on storm-damaged
homes, with no work having been commenced by December 2013, more than 14 months after
Sandy.120
The city cited a range of reasons for its major delays and cost overrides, including
program design and implementation. Federal requirements governing expenditure of CDBG-DR
grant funds necessitated that many homeowner applicants navigate multiple rounds of income
verification, damage inspections, and assurances that Build It Back Program funds were not
duplicating home rehabilitation benefits already covered by SBA disaster loans or FEMA-funded
repair programs.121 Recalibrating program implementation to fully accommodate these federal
requirements meant that just a few months after rolling out Build It Back, the city changed
program requirements and required completion of new forms, thus causing significant confusion
amongst homeowners.122
Local regulatory requirements also impeded implementation. Build It Back required that
homeowners work with the city’s Department of Buildings to close all “open” permits for work
they commenced before—sometimes years before—the proposed Build It Back Program rehab
work.123 Further, as detailed below in Section VI, if the homeowners’ post-storm repair work
required a home’s significant reconfiguration on small, narrow city lots, the proposed work often
triggered local zoning code provisions that necessitated variances to allow minor
118
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nonconformities with the strict requirements of the city’s zoning code.124 These local zoning
approvals demanded homeowners navigate a time-consuming public process while otherwise
overseeing reconstruction of the storm-damaged home. To complicate matters, the city’s initial
design of the program overlooked the potential value of coordinating program implementation
directly with neighborhood-based community groups.125 This meant that Build It Back Program
administrators faced the challenge of implementing a program without neighborhood-based case
managers who could coordinate communication with residents regarding program changes and
delays.
Now in the fifth year of post-storm recovery, progress toward the program’s goals of
rebuilding homes and communities has accelerated. At the end of May 2017, the city reported
that it had completed repairs on almost three-fourths of homes enrolled in the program.126 But in
some neighborhoods, such as Breezy Point in Queens, repair work had been completed on fewer
than half of the 425 homes enrolled.127 Homeowner attrition has also been significant. Between
May 2016 and May 2017, the program saw 466 homeowners drop out, equal to 13% of the total
homeowners who remained in the program as of May 2016.128
B. New York’s and New Jersey’s State-level Recovery Programs
While New York City received a direct allocation of CDBG-DR funding from the federal
government and used those funds to pay for long-term recovery initiatives such as Build It Back
and other programs, the states of New York and New Jersey used their own CDBG-DR
allocations to craft programs tailored to the needs of each state and consistent with the respective
governors’ approaches and attitudes toward the state role in recovery. New York Governor
Andrew Cuomo established the Governor’s Office of Storm Recovery (GOSR) in June 2013 to
oversee recovery efforts from Sandy as well as the previous year’s Hurricane Irene and Tropical
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Storm Lee, which together affected 38 of the state’s 62 counties.129 GOSR, also sometimes
referred to as “NY Rising,” was funded primarily with $4.4 billion in CDBG-DR funds and
focused on four program areas, mainly, though not exclusively, targeting areas outside New
York City: housing recovery, small business recovery, community reconstruction, and
infrastructure.
GOSR’s housing recovery programs included repair, mitigation, and buyout programs, as
well as targeted assistance for multifamily rental property owners, cooperatives, and
condominiums in addition to the state’s buyout and acquisition programs.130 The Interim
Mortgage Assistance Program was also created, to assist homeowners with mortgage payments
and rental housing costs if state-funded repairs, mitigation, and elevation projects forced them to
vacate their homes temporarily.131 Small businesses were eligible for grants of $50,000 to
$250,000, loans of up to $1 million, and mentoring assistance.132 The NY Rising Community
Reconstruction Program funded community-based recovery and resilience plans created through
a state-mandated participatory process with technical assistance provided by the New York State
Department of State and private planning consultants.133 The 124 participating communities
including municipalities, counties, and 16 New York City neighborhoods also received more
than $700 million in cumulative grants to jumpstart implementation of the plans.134 Additionally,
infrastructure programs included grants to municipalities for use as a nonfederal match for
FEMA PA grant applications, $383 million to fund sewer repair and improvement in Suffolk
County, and projects like beach stabilization efforts at Robert Moses State Park on Long
Island.135
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New Jersey Governor Chris Christie, similarly, used the flexibility of his state’s $4.2
billion in CDBG-DR funding to develop locally appropriate responses under the umbrella of
ReNew Jersey Stronger, coordinated by the Governor’s Office of Recovery and Rebuilding.136
The state developed more than two dozen distinct programs focusing primarily on homeowners,
rental housing, economic revitalization, infrastructure, and local governments. The
Reconstruction, Rehabilitation, Elevation, and Mitigation Program, for instance, focused on
primary residences.137 Another program, the Low-to-Moderate Income Homeowners Rebuilding
Program, provided an additional pool of $50 million focused on lower income property owners,
with special consideration for owners of substantially damaged manufactured homes.138 The
Superstorm Sandy Blue Acres Program allocated $300 million to buy approximately 1,300
Sandy-affected or flood-prone properties.139
New Jersey’s Resettlement Program awarded $10,000 grants to owners of damaged
properties to remain in their existing home or buy a new home in the same county, while the
Sandy Homebuyer Assistance Program provided $50,000 forgivable interest-free loans to buyers
purchasing primary residences in any of the nine New Jersey counties most affected by Sandy. 140
New Jersey renters and landlords were also eligible to apply for a host of programs including the
Tenant-based Rental Assistance Program, the Landlord Incentive Program, the Landlord Rental
Repair Program, the Fund for Restoration of Multifamily Housing, and the Predevelopment Fund
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for Affordable Rental Housing, which focused primarily on rebuilding and enhancing the state’s
supply of affordable rental property.141
New Jersey’s business recovery programs included the Stronger NJ Business Grant
Program, providing grants or forgivable loans of up to $50,000 to rebuild Sandy-damaged
businesses, and the Stronger NJ Business Loan Program, providing low-interest recovery loans
capped at $5 million.142 Local government grants were available through the Post-Sandy
Planning Assistance Grant Program designed to help municipalities develop or update
community plans such as master plans, hazard mitigation plans, and others.143 The Essential
Services Grant and Zoning Code Enforcement Grant Program were both designed to help
communities address the increased workload and associated personnel costs and simultaneous
revenue losses that Sandy created, while the Unsafe Structures Demolition Program, Flood
Hazard Risk Reduction Program, Neighborhood and Community Revitalization Program, and
Neighborhood Enhancement Program also made CDBG-DR funds available to municipalities to
address various community-scale recovery, rebuilding, and resilience issues.144
As the New York City, New York state, and New Jersey programs show, the inherent
flexibility of CDBG-DR funding has been an important component of local recovery, with
grantees using CDBG-DR funds to develop suites of programs addressing a range of recovery
issues that are uniquely responsive to local conditions. CDBG-DR funds, like the CDBG
program generally, “stand out as among the most flexible” sources of recovery aid available.145
But there are downsides inherent in this dynamic as well. First, CDBG-DR’s flexibility is
relative. It only points to the rigidity and limitations of most other federal recovery programs,
which often constrain the utility and effectiveness of those programs for affected residents,
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thereby placing significant strain on CDBG-DR to make up for the deficiencies and limitations
of other federal programs.
Second, state and local programs funded by CDBG-DR must be created from the ground
up after a disaster. Thus, they demand a high degree of capacity and expertise on the part of the
governments that receive the CDBG-DR funds. This issue was somewhat muted after Sandy,
given the significant amount of expertise available in the region related to issues like disaster
recovery, urban planning, and finance, but this expertise is not always in ready supply in other
parts of the country. Additionally, CDBG-DR funds are not delivered to the states (or New York
City) instantaneously and programs cannot be created overnight. As a result, there is a built-in
time lag during which time affected residents, businesses, and communities must rely only on
existing limited federal programs or local funds, if available.
Finally, state and local programs, though well intentioned and designed to work
effectively in local contexts, must be created quickly and without time for testing and refinement.
The New York City Build It Back Program has been a sobering example of how an innovative
and well-intentioned program may nonetheless prove largely unworkable or inefficient, but that
knowledge has come far too late to help thousands of homeowners who placed their faith in the
program only to be left unserved for years.
The Sandy experience illustrates that it is not realistic to expect that local governments
can use the flexibility of CDBG-DR funding to fully overcome shortcomings of federal recovery
programs. Even in a region with significant recovery resources, local and state governments
faced significant challenges. However, as discussed in Section V, implementation of federal
programs has also encountered obstacles. These obstacles are due not only to implementing
regulations at odds with the New York City region’s development pattern, but also due to the
pervasive challenge presented by the different land development standards imposed by local
governments.

V.

Flawed Law and Policy Impaired a More Efficient and Equitable Response and

Recovery: Highlighting Sandy Recovery Challenges by Sector
Laws play an important role in facilitating and impeding community recovery. The preceding
section describes how state and local governments harnessed federal funding, specifically federal
community development block grant monies, to create their own recovery programs. These
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recovery programs took advantage of CDBG-DR’s more flexible legal requirements to create
programs attuned to local needs and conditions. But not all laws encountered in the Sandy longterm recovery proved as flexible or accommodating.
Unfortunately, New York City and the states of New Jersey and New York were forced
to roll out their recovery programs in a legal landscape containing significant obstacles to
efficient and equitable community recovery. Superstorm Sandy demonstrated that disaster
recovery can be significantly impeded by well-intentioned but flawed legal infrastructure.146
These flaws manifest themselves when a jurisdiction lacks laws and policies that facilitate
resilient recovery.147 These flaws are also revealed when a jurisdiction’s existing laws prove too
rigid and ill-suited for achieving positive recovery outcomes. The consequences are significant.
The absence of critical laws or policies may leave a community without a legal tool or “gear”
that might otherwise leverage optimal response and recovery results. Further, a law that
hinders—or even renders unlawful—the recovery interventions that might be most helpful to
individuals, businesses, or neighborhoods effectively denies the full measure of relief to affected
communities.
A necessary step to devising more effective disaster recovery programs is to develop an
increasingly nuanced appreciation for how a disaster’s context makes particular demands on the
legal and policy landscape. A catastrophic coastal storm that devastates a densely settled
metropolitan area requires a legal and institutional tool chest somewhat different from the one
that serves a midwestern community decimated by a tornado or a sprawling southern city’s
recovery from a hurricane. Thus, some of the hard-earned lessons flowing from the Sandy
recovery will be most applicable to recovery from future disasters in dense urban places and
some may indeed be unique to the New York region. Yet, many of Sandy’s long-term recovery
lessons will have broad reach and application. Lessons flowing from Sandy can help illuminate
the general types of challenges that other communities may face, even if specific local conditions
are very different.
This section provides detailed snapshots of four legal infrastructure deficiencies revealed
by Sandy. These examples are representative of the array of legal challenges communities face,
146
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but they are not exhaustive. They are taken from federal, state, and local laws and policies, and
focus primarily on the recovery of residences and businesses, including physical recovery (i.e.,
rebuilding and mitigation) and, in the case of businesses, operational recovery. These examples
are particularly illustrative in that they show how existing legal frameworks can hinder effective
recovery. The first example illustrates how, after Sandy, federal disaster recovery programs
proved a poor fit for densely settled urban neighborhoods and the types of buildings that
constitute them. The second example shows how forms of property ownership common in the
Sandy region created barriers to effective household recovery for many residents. The third
example addresses the roadblocks to business recovery inherent in existing policies. The fourth
and final example highlights how even a community’s own zoning code can be an impediment to
smooth and rapid recovery.

A.

Recovering and Rebuilding Damaged Structures in Urban Neighborhoods

One of the principal challenges to a successful recovery from Sandy has been the visible
disconnect between existing federal recovery policies and the realities of life in densely settled
urban neighborhoods. The Sandy long-term recovery demonstrates that federal programs prove a
poor fit for older vintage, mixed-use, high-density urban neighborhoods. In the United States as a
whole, only 12.6% of housing units are located in structures built prior to 1940; in New York
City that number is three times higher (40.3%).148 Rebuilding and retrofitting older structures—
both residential and commercial—present challenges that are much different from suburban
areas that are populated largely with single-family detached homes. Apart from their age, urban
buildings are also more likely to be attached to one another and situated in neighborhoods that
host a mix of uses.
In New York City and Hoboken, such neighborhoods may contain ground-level
commercial uses (retail, restaurant, office, and service) with upper floors supporting residential
units or offices.149 Community uses such as schools, churches, healthcare facilities, libraries, and

148
149

See U.S. Census Bureau, supra note 16.

See, e.g., Hannah Frishberg, What Is a Mixed-Use Property? A Guide to the Residential-Commercial Hybrid,
BROWNSTONER, July 27, 2016, https://www.brownstoner.com/real-estate-market/mixed-use-property-definitionadvantages-disadvantages-guide/; TIM EVANS, NEW JERSEY FUTURE, WHERE ARE WE GOING? IMPLICATIONS OF
RECENT DEMOGRAPHIC TRENDS IN NEW JERSEY (2017) (showing that Hoboken, New Jersey, is one of the few
places in the state that is attracting millennials, in large part because of its convenient, mixed-use neighborhoods),
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others may also be mixed into these neighborhoods at ground level or on upper floors.150 In other
New York City region neighborhoods, light industrial uses co-exist with retail, office, hotel, and
even residential units.151 Even in less densely populated parts of the region, such as suburban
Long Island and New Jersey, the average densities, housing typologies, and tenure types (i.e.,
rental or home ownership) may be very different from the more typical suburban model found in
much of the rest of the United States where single-family homes and single-use zoning are the
norm.152
The Sandy long-term recovery highlighted a range of ways that the Sandy region’s urban
context frustrated the then-existing federal standards for recovery-related decisions. Regulations
applicable to recovery might be straightforwardly applied in Montpelier, New Orleans, and
Boulder, but they caused consternation in New York City and Hoboken.
For instance, consider flood insurance regulations and the seemingly simple question:
what is a basement? In many parts of the country that would cause little confusion; according to
the NFIP, a basement is “[a]ny area of the building having its floor subgrade (below ground
level) on all sides.”153 However, this seemingly straightforward definition became a source of
significant concern for many building owners after Sandy.154 In New York City, Hoboken, Jersey
City, and other municipalities in the region, the NFIP definition of a basement also technically
describes many thousands of housing and retail units at the lowest level of attached row houses
that are known in the local vernacular as “ground floor” or “garden” units.155 Such units may be
located anywhere from a few inches to three feet below grade and, if conforming to stipulations
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apartments” as “ground level spaces that are in fact partly below grade”), http://www.njfuture.org/wpcontent/uploads/2014/05/Hoboken_Final.pdf.
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in local laws, are legal for use as individual apartments, shops, offices, or fully habitable levels
of a single-family home.156 Many buildings containing this kind of unit actually have an
additional cellar or basement level underneath this “ground” level.157 However, while these units
may sit above a second basement, and although they are discrete legal residences or commercial
units according to local zoning and building codes, these units are classified as basements and
are therefore ineligible for NFIP reimbursement.158
One infamous case involved a Hoboken resident whose NFIP claim was denied because
his apartment was determined to be 0.13 inches below grade.159 As Hoboken Mayor Dawn
Zimmer testified to the Senate Committee on Small Business and Entrepreneurship in December
2012, this rigid and overbroad definition of basement exemplifies the disconnect between onesize-fits-most federal recovery policy and the realities found in many American cities, especially
older coastal cities:
These rules do not reflect the reality that in places like Hoboken, New York City,
and other urban areas, the premises characterized as basements house vibrant
businesses and principal residences which are critical elements to the vibrancy of
our cities. A store or apartment that requires you to walk down one or two steps is
plain and simply not a basement. The business owners and residents who work
and live in these stores and homes are required to buy flood insurance, are
required to pay premiums into the flood insurance system, yet they receive
virtually no coverage.160
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As Mayor Zimmer’s comments underscore, the NFIP’s definition of a basement failed to
capture the subtle, but essential, nuances differentiating structures common to Hoboken and
Brooklyn from those often encountered in Topeka or Tuscaloosa. The consequences of this
regulatory disconnect were significant. Hundreds of residents and business owners were denied
their flood insurance payouts, thus crippling their family or business efforts to recover.161
The NFIP’s broad definition for “basement” may be well suited for contemporary or
modern structures; however, for significant parts of the Sandy region’s older and more dense
building stock, this provides just one example of federal recovery policy poorly calibrated to
address recovery from major natural hazards.
Another example relates to the way in which the NFIP recognizes compliance with NFIP
guidelines for rebuilding in the flood zone. The NFIP recognizes four categories of compliance
eligible for NFIP funding after a damaging event: relocation, demolition, elevation, or
floodproofing.162 Each of the four categories has specific and unique challenges in the New York
metro area. In a practical sense, relocation of buildings attached to their neighbors presents
extraordinary logistical challenges and, thus, is expensive. Moreover, there is scant available
land to relocate structures, let alone space to move entire urban neighborhoods.163
Except for a small area in the New York City borough of Staten Island and a few
locations in Nassau and Suffolk Counties on Long Island that were part of a modest New York
state-sponsored program, property buyout and acquisition programs have not been considered
necessary or realistic.164 Relocation and demolition have also largely been politically infeasible
in the post-Sandy dialogue; as then-mayor Michael Bloomberg stated in June 2013, “We cannot
and will not abandon our waterfront. It’s one of our greatest assets. We must protect it, not
161
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retreat from it.”165 Thus, elevation and floodproofing have remained as the predominant
strategies used by property owners looking to rebuild and remain NFIP compliant.
Floodproofing older and attached buildings can be challenging, but most can be
overcome even if they create additional expenses for property owners; elevation, however,
creates many more challenges in a dense urban context. FEMA promotes elevation of structures
as one of the most effective ways to protect against future flood-related risk.166 In many Sandyaffected communities, elevation has been considered undesirable because it is expensive,
inconvenient (because it creates the need to use stairs or ramps to access a building), and
aesthetically undesirable (because it fundamentally alters the character of a neighborhood). 167
These grievances are not unique to the Sandy region, but local conditions create an additional
layer of challenges.
Party-wall structures such as row houses and mid-rise commercial and mixed-use
buildings, which are common in the region, are extremely difficult to elevate from an
engineering perspective and often almost impossible from a financial perspective.168 In many
cases, elevation may cost more than the building is worth.169 Moreover, in the New York metro
region, a significant percentage of these attached units are masonry and steel frame construction,
which are inherently more resistant to flood-related risks than building typologies more common
in other parts of the United States (e.g., balloon-framed, sheetrock-walled single-family homes
and slab-on-grade commercial buildings).170 However, this inherent resiliency is not accounted
for in NFIP guidelines.171
See Jarrett Murphy, Sandy+3: NYC Not Pulling Back From the Water’s Edge, CITY LIMITS, Oct. 14, 2015,
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Elevation can also come into conflict with other federal policies. Use of public funds for
reconstruction, and in older buildings the mere act of doing the reconstruction regardless of the
funding source, may trigger mandatory compliance with the Americans With Disabilities Act
(ADA).172 But ADA compliance, in turn, may be complicated by the design of the existing
building, further complicated by the elevation strategy, and, finally, constrained by local building
and zoning codes.173
For instance, in a publicly accessible building with ground-floor access that is already
built to the edge of the property line, any alteration (e.g., elevation) would trigger an ADA
requirement that “to the maximum extent feasible, the altered portions of the facility are readily
accessible to and usable by individuals with disabilities, including individuals who use
wheelchairs.”174 In practice, this would require the building owner to add an elevator or entrance
ramps reaching the design flood elevation (DFE) (i.e., the base flood elevation, or BFE, plus an
additional amount dictated by local law; this additional increment above the BFE is known as
“freeboard”). But, in New York City, ramps are permitted obstructions for only 44 inches past
the build-to line on the parcel’s street-facing facade, which in many cases is insufficient space to
provide a useable and ADA-compliant ramp.175 These types of conflict between NFIP
requirements and local codes are further explored in Section V.D.

B.

Navigating Forms of Ownership That Predominate in Urban Neighborhoods

Other issues beyond physical design can also create challenges when attempting to apply
narrowly designed federal recovery programs in dense urban environments, and even the most
fundamental property law questions regarding form of ownership can become significant.176 A
particular recovery challenge in New York City, and one that would also be pertinent to a lesser
172
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174

See U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, supra note 172.

175

See RESILIENT RETAIL, supra note 18.

176

See, e.g., Staying on Task in Louisiana, APPLESEED NETWORK, Nov. 11, 2011 (post-Katrina and post-Rita
exposed issues with families not having clear title to land passed down through generations outside of the legal
system), http://www.appleseednetwork.org/11_21_2011/.

PRE-PUBLICATION DRAFT: Please cite from published version
degree in other large cities like Miami, Chicago, or Washington, D.C., is the presence of
significant numbers of cooperative and condominium apartment buildings. Of New York City’s
3.4 million housing units in 2014, almost 10% (330,679 units) were located in buildings under
the cooperative form of ownership and another 5% were condominiums.177 New York
University’s Furman Center for Real Estate and Urban Policy estimates that 20% of the housing
units in Sandy’s flood zone were cooperatives and another 8% were condominiums.178
For owners of such units there are multiple barriers to recovery under existing law. As
currently interpreted by FEMA, the Stafford Act restricts the aid available to cooperatives and
condominiums because of the way that ownership of these housing units is structured from a
legal perspective.179 Condominium units are real property owned by individual owners who live
in their units and pay dues to a condominium association that maintains common areas of the
building or complex.180 As such, individual condominium unit owners can legally insure their
units against flood damage by purchasing the NFIP’s Standard Flood Insurance Policy Dwelling
Form just as a single-family homeowner would.181 Alternatively, condominium associations may
elect to insure the entire building or complex (including both common areas as well as residential
units) through an NFIP Residential Condominium Building Association Policy (RCBAP). An
RCBAP offers coverage for either the full replacement cost of the building, including funds to
repair or replace the foundation and supporting structures, or $250,000 multiplied by the number
of units in the building, whichever amount is smaller.182 Content insurance for $100,000 per unit
is also available.183
However, if a condominium association elects not to purchase an RCBAP, individual unit
owners (as members of the condominium association) are then liable for repair of damaged
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common areas out of pocket. While the Stafford Act authorizes FEMA to provide emergency
recovery funds for repair of uninsured or underinsured owner-occupied primary residences under
the HA portion of the IHP, FEMA holds that the Stafford Act “does not provide the Agency with
the authority to award grants to housing cooperatives and condominium associations to repair
common-area damage as they are not, by any definition, individuals or households and are
considered business associations.”184 In many condominiums in the Sandy region without
RCBAP coverage, repairs to common elements (e.g., roofs, lobbies, stairwells, elevators, heating
and cooling equipment) were $250,000 or more, and could only be paid through assessments on
the owners of units in the association.185 It is troubling and instructive that this costly disconnect
between FEMA program regulations and the condominium form of ownership could have been
anticipated, because this programmatic shortcoming was noted as far back as the 1994
Northridge (California) earthquake. It was never resolved in the interim.186
The situation for cooperatives is even more restrictive. Unlike condominiums, owners of
cooperative units do not own real property. Rather, they own shares in a nonprofit corporation
(the “cooperative”) that, in turn, owns the entirety of the building or complex. Shareholders sign
proprietary leases giving them the legal right to occupy a specific unit within the complex. Under
current FEMA regulations, cooperatives are considered businesses, so individual unit owners are
in effect not primarily residents at all, but simply corporate shareholders.187 They are thus
ineligible to purchase property insurance through the NFIP because they do not technically own
a residence.188 This legal distinction creates a challenge for residents of cooperatives, especially
those on low floors during flood events who are not eligible to purchase NFIP coverage even if
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they own an apartment in the floodplain.189 Moreover, while cooperative corporations can
purchase NFIP coverage to insure common areas for a maximum of $250,000 under the General
Property Form, cooperatives are specifically ineligible for the much more substantial coverage
available under the RCBAP.190 This dynamic leaves cooperative owners—even more so than
condominium owners—deeply exposed to liability for significant costs if their building’s
common areas or essential infrastructure are damaged by flooding.
Cooperative ownership further restricts coverage for recovery in other ways as well.
While uninsured residents of cooperative units are eligible for FEMA assistance under §408 of
the Stafford Act (i.e., HA and other needs assistance components of the IHP),191 the legal
structure of a cooperative limits how HA funds can be spent. Unlike condominiums, cooperative
shareholders do not own the units in which they reside; rather, they rent the units from the
corporation of which they are also an owner. Thus, because individual units are not considered
“owner-occupied,” HA funds cannot be used to repair damaged walls, ceilings, floors, or
windows, all of which are property of the cooperative corporation, not individual
shareholder/tenants that reside in affected units.192
These debilitating limitations on NFIP coverage and FEMA assistance for condominium
and cooperative owners were widely felt across the region after Sandy.
In response, then-Rep. Steve Israel (D-N.Y.) introduced H.R. 2887 in July 2013 “[t]o
amend the Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act to provide
assistance for condominiums and housing cooperatives damaged by a major disaster, and for
other purposes,” which was eventually referred to the Subcommittee on Economic Development,
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See NATIONAL FLOOD INSURANCE PROGRAM DWELLING FORM, supra note 162, at 5 (NFIP standard flood
insurance coverage only offered to non-condominium residential buildings designed for principal use as a dwelling
for one to four families, or a single-family dwelling unit in a condominium building).
190

See NFIP FLOOD INSURANCE MANUAL, supra note 182, at GR 7.
See INDIVIDUAL ASSISTANCE FOR HOUSING COOPERATIVES AND CONDOMINIUM ASSOCIATIONS, supra note 184,
at 3.
191

192

See FEMA, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY, INDIVIDUALS AND HOUSEHOLDS PROGRAM UNIFIED
GUIDANCE (IHPUG) 19 (2016), https://www.fema.gov/media-library-data/14835670808281201b6eebf9fbbd7c8a070fddb308971/FEMAIHPUG_CoverEdit_December2016.pdf. However, cooperatives,
condominium associations, and homeowner’s associations are eligible for low-interest SBA loans of up to $2
million for repair of common areas and infrastructure. Residents may apply for up to $200,000 for repair of their
units and an additional $40,000 to replace personal property.

PRE-PUBLICATION DRAFT: Please cite from published version
Public Buildings, and Emergency Management.193 However, Congress took no further action on
the bill.194 To address some of the challenges H.R. 2887 would have rectified, certain ad hoc
solutions were created by state and local governments. New York City structured the Rapid
Repairs Program to include cooperatives and condominiums while Build It Back contained the
Multi-family Program for rental properties, condominiums, and cooperatives.195 New York state
developed the Cooperative and Condominium Recovery Program to assist cooperatives,
condominium associations, and homeowner associations in funding repairs to common areas and
individual units.196
While condominium and cooperative ownership is much more common in the New York
metro region than in many other parts of the country, these challenges nonetheless highlight the
inherent difficulty in crafting one-size-fits-most national policies in the face of varying local
conditions. Every community has its own mix of specific land use patterns, building typologies,
and occupancy types (i.e., rental, ownership, informal, etc.). The way these issues interact with
federal recovery regulations will vary from place to place, and it is inevitable that an approach
designed to best address the needs primarily of owners of single-family, standalone, owneroccupied housing will not be as effective for residents of other kinds of properties. This points to
the enduring challenge of developing recovery policies that are simultaneously effective and
flexible, but lack of flexible recovery policies is not only a challenge for dense urban
communities.
Another excellent example would be the higher rates of so-called “heirs’ property”—
families living in homes where legal title remains in long-deceased relatives—in some parts of
the United States.197 These deceased relatives lacked wills passing title to their property to
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family, or their family did not settle their estate following the relative’s death.198 This means
current occupants cannot show “clear title” to storm-damaged property and, thus, cannot receive
federal disaster funds for home repair.199 This has been recognized as a major impediment to
recovery in the southern United States’ Black Belt where a large number of African Americans
were historically excluded from, or did not use, legal channels to pass property from one
generation to the next.200 For a more recent example, following 2017’s Hurricane Maria,
thousands of residents of Puerto Rico were denied federal recovery aid because they could not
supply evidence that they owned their homes, or even proof of residence.201 As Politico reported
in 2017, “More than half of Puerto Rico’s houses are ‘informal,’ a euphemism for illegally
constructed. As many as one in five are built on private or government land.”202 Until federal
policies can be developed that are sensitive to these varied and unique place-based ownership
issues, these kinds of challenges will remain.

C.

Helping Businesses Address Operational and Physical Recovery Challenges

Post-Sandy recovery challenges were not constrained to homeowners and residential renters.
Businesses in the region also faced their own set of vexing recovery challenges after Sandy.
Sandy’s impacts were widespread, affecting not only the coastal neighborhoods that contain
many of the region’s small industrial businesses, but also retail stores, restaurants, and other
types of businesses.203 Foremost among these challenges were insurance-related issues. While
lenders typically require mortgaged properties in SFHAs to have flood insurance, coverage is
optional for properties located in the SFHA that are owned outright as well as for all businesses
outside the SFHA.
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New York City restaurants faced in the aftermath of Sandy), https://newyork.seriouseats.com/2012/11/hurricanesandy-restaurants-nyc-damages.html.
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But FEMA’s flood insurance rate maps (FIRMs) in place in 2012 when Sandy struck
were primarily based on data collected in 1983, and the amount of land flooded during Sandy
was more than 50% larger than the SFHA delineated on the existing FIRMs.204 Because many
businesses were outside the current SFHA, many did not purchase flood insurance, and most
commercial policies exclude flooding from their coverage.205 Additionally, many businesses do
not own the buildings that they are located in and are thus not allowed to purchase coverage for
the building through the NFIP, making them reliant on landlords to either purchase flood
insurance for the building or pay for repairs directly.
At the same time, even for those businesses with flood insurance, whether located inside
or outside the SFHA, coverage was often inadequate, especially for businesses with expensive
equipment or inventory, because the NFIP limits compensation for businesses to $500,000 for
structural damage and an additional $500,000 for contents.206 There were also other NFIP
limitations. Sewer backups, for instance, which were common after Sandy even in
neighborhoods that did not experience surface flooding, are not covered by the NFIP unless the
backup “is a direct result of flooding.”207
The NFIP also does not cover vehicles.208 Many manufacturing and service-related
businesses affected by Sandy rely heavily on vehicles as part of their operations. While some
owners of affected business did have optional flood coverage on their business vehicles, many
did not. In an additional layer of irony, many of these same businesses, such as those with heavy
equipment that could be used in debris removal or infrastructure repair projects, experienced an
increased demand for their services and a potential windfall after Sandy, but were unable to
capitalize on the opportunity because of the damage they sustained and their inability to finance
their recovery.
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Finally, turning to the physical aspect of recovery, businesses forced to elevate as a
recovery and mitigation strategy face a cascading set of design and operations challenges. Unlike
in areas where most trips are made by automobile, commercial success in dense urban regions
often depends on “foot traffic” or easy pedestrian access to commercial and service uses in
ground-floor spaces.209 FEMA only allows space below the BFE in an elevated building to be
used for building access, automobile parking, and storage. This means that what had been a
“ground floor” business may have to relocate substantially above grade, thereby impacting its
ability to attract pedestrian customers.210
Again, basements can also become a complicating issue. Due to the high cost of real
estate and typically small floor plan of buildings in the Sandy region, many businesses rely on
basements to provide space for functions like restrooms and offices, thereby freeing up more
valuable ground-floor space for core business uses.211 If forced to move these supporting uses
out of the basement, and potentially even above the ground floor, businesses lose a significant
amount of space for inventory or restaurant seating or other more lucrative uses. Restaurants face
an additional challenge; many rely on basements or cellars to provide space for “prep
kitchens.”212 This restaurant layout strategy provides more seating on the (typically much more
expensive) ground-floor space. Thus, while meeting NFIP programmatic requirements will help
make businesses more resilient to future storms and allow them to qualify for NFIP coverage,
these kinds of mitigation measures will also have significant long-term negative financial
implications.213
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D.

Local Government Ordinances as Hidden Obstacles to Recovery: The Example of
Zoning Codes

Local land development functions, including formulating and administering zoning and building
codes, play important roles in guiding community recovery. These functions can either be
vectors for safer, more efficient growth or obstacles to recovery. In long-term recovery processes
sometimes characterized by press coverage of brazen contractor fraud,214 monumental rebuilding
projects,215 and alarming bureaucratic breakdowns,216 problems created by local ordinances seem
like low-level annoyances. Local code requirements are less likely to make headlines. Zoning
code problems are inherently local and vary based on the town, city, or county where a
homeowner or business is located.217 Zoning code issues are also difficult for most people to
appreciate because they involve technical legal language. Perhaps the main reason local code
requirements remain “hidden in plain sight” following a disaster is that local governments do not
begin to appreciate the problem until rebuilding has begun. The Sandy long-term recovery
experience suggests that local zoning and building codes have indeed created some unnecessary
obstacles to recovery.
Although discrete and technical by nature, the comparatively latent character of zoning
codes’ role in long-term disaster recovery cannot be overlooked if communities wish to rebound
from disaster in a timely and equitable manner. Local code compliance, including building
codes, health and safety codes, and zoning codes, is still a requirement for post-disaster recovery
projects.218 Compliance with local codes authorizes local permits, which in turn allows
214
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individual recovery projects to proceed. While unnecessary or narrowly conceived zoning code
requirements may create merely inconvenient recovery delays for families with ample financial
resources, for low- and moderate-income families including many elderly households, inapt
zoning requirements can create a significant barrier to rebuilding a home or business.
At the very least, confusing or burdensome local requirements can saddle disaster victims
with additional expenses and delays that they cannot easily afford, especially if they lack access
to savings, insurance, or professional assistance that can help secure favorable local government
review of a zoning application. Before disasters strike, local governments must consider how
local codes and processes can be designed or modified in advance to help residents rebuild
safely, sustainably, and quickly. This section highlights three ways in which local codes can
prove ill-suited to post-disaster recovery needs using examples from Sandy.

1. Dimensional zoning requirements: Post-disaster repairs and modifications that
transgress height and set-back limitations
Images of Sandy’s devastating impact frequently showed homes sitting cheek-and-jowl with one
another.219 On the Jersey Shore and in coastal Long Island neighborhoods, homes were pushed
from their foundations by storm surge and thousands of homeowners were forced to comply with
federal requirements to elevate structures above the BFE in order to remain eligible for NFIP
coverage against future storms.220 Other homeowners in high-risk areas decided it was simply
prudent to elevate, even though their homes did not incur significant damage during Sandy.221
However, generally speaking, no homeowner was allowed to elevate a home in violation of local

(“Failure to follow the requirements of all applicable laws during each phase of a disaster may significantly impact a
local government's ability to receive assistance in its most crucial time of need”).
219
See, e.g., Sarah Jacobs, 31 Photos That Show the Destruction of Hurricane Sandy 5 Years Ago, BUS. INSIDER,
Oct. 24, 2017 (highlight photos of Sandy’s impact on Long Island’s Breezy Point neighborhood),
http://www.businessinsider.com/a-look-back-at-sandys-destruction-2016-9.
In New York City alone, 628 homeowners were granted permission to elevate their homes on or before Sandy’s
fifth anniversary. See Bridget Downes & Anthony Rifilato, Hurricane Sandy, Five Years On: Some Residents Are
Still Displaced, Rebuilding, LI HERALD.COM, Oct. 26, 2017,
http://www.liherald.com/eastrockaway/stories/hurricane-sandy-five-years-on,97044. In October 2017, 282 permits
for elevation were still pending. See id.
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government set-back or height requirements merely because it was necessary or prudent.222
Construction could not proceed without compliance with local zoning and building codes.
Dimensional zoning requirements are code provisions that limit a building’s size or
envelope. Height limitations, for instance, cap a building’s elevation above street level.223 Setback limitations establish a minimum distance between the structure and the edge of the property
it improves.224 A proposed structure demonstrating anything less than exacting compliance with
these and similar standards generally requires a building owner to seek relief from a local
government in the form of a variance.225 There is little dispute that building height and set-back
requirements serve a valuable purpose.
In urbanized settings, where land is scarce and often expensive, structures should be sited
in a manner that promotes harmony with surrounding buildings. Property owners seeking relief
from these requirements must typically prepare a detailed technical application, pay a fee, and
wait for a hearing date before the local government’s variance review board.226 No building
permit or certificate of occupancy will be issued if, without a variance, the structure exceeds the
local government height or set-back requirements.227 At best, the process takes weeks. At worst,
it extends for months, particularly following a disaster when the hearing docket is long.228
Variances from height and set-back requirements generally allow individual homeowners
a reprieve from otherwise rigid zoning code provisions that are somehow uniquely burdensome
222
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to a specific property owner. For instance, odd shaped lots, uniquely steep terrain, and other
physical characteristics are typically grounds for a variance request. But should the requirement
for seeking a variance be imposed when the applicant’s request for relief is in response to an
external agency’s requirement or when it stems from a desire to make a potentially vulnerable
structure less vulnerable to a future hazard event? Not all communities agree.
Following Sandy, some communities waived the requirement for seeking a variance to
exceed height limitations when elevating homes as long as they were located in a flood plain.229
Other communities still required property owners to navigate the normal local government
variance review process.230 In the small city of Long Beach on Long Island’s southern shore, for
instance, elevations of homes necessitated a local Board of Zoning Appeals hearing to secure
permission to add the stairs and porches necessary to access elevated homes if those features
encroached into required front and side yard setbacks.231 In February 2016, after approving more
than 90 applications through this time-consuming public hearing process, the city amended its
zoning ordinance to allow elevation and associated necessary encroachments in some city
neighborhoods with only planning staff approval.232
Height and set-back requirements were also quickly recognized as potential impediments
to recovery in New York City. The city’s planners quickly recognized the challenges that would
be created by trying to shoehorn NFIP-compliant rehabilitation and rebuilding into the city’s
existing zoning code and building code restrictions. Three months after Sandy, FEMA issued
new advisory base flood elevation maps for New York City that differed significantly from the
maps in place at the time of the storm.233 On January 31, 2013, three days after the release of the
new FEMA maps, Mayor Bloomberg issued Executive Order No. 230, Emergency Order to
Suspend Zoning Provisions to Facilitate Reconstruction in Accordance With Enhanced Flood
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See e.g., John Asbury, Home-raising Red Tape Cut in Long Beach, NEWSDAY, Feb. 23, 2016,
https://www.newsday.com/long-island/nassau/red-tape-cut-in-long-beach-to-assist-homes-being-raised-1.11497881
(describing the City of Long Beach’s permitting procedures).
231

John Asbury, Home-raising Red Tape Cut in Long Beach, NEWSDAY, Feb. 23, 2016,
https://www.newsday.com/long-island/nassau/red-tape-cut-in-long-beach-to-assist-homes-being-raised-1.11497881.
232
233

See id.

See Christina Boyle & Erin Durkin, FEMA Releases New Flood Maps Showing 35,000 More New York City,
Westchester Buildings at Risk, N.Y. DAILY NEWS, Jan. 29, 2013, http://www.nydailynews.com/new-york/new-femaflood-map-doubles-at-risk-buildings-city-article-1.1249555.

PRE-PUBLICATION DRAFT: Please cite from published version
Resistant Construction Standards.234 The order suspended height restrictions and various other
aspects of the zoning code to facilitate rapidly rebuilding damaged structures in compliance with
NFIP requirements. The Department of City Planning also drafted a 51-page set of zoning code
modifications, the Flood Resilience Text Amendment, which was eventually approved by the
New York City Council on October 9, 2013.235 The Amendment facilitates flood-resistant
construction and rebuilding in the 100-year floodplain, addressing issues such as building height,
ingress and egress, locating of mechanical systems and parking, as well as other planning- and
building-related issues.236

2. Properties not conforming to zoning codes pre-disaster: Amortization or
accommodation of nonconforming structures
Not all lots and structures comply with the letter of local zoning codes. This is a common
phenomenon. The nonconformity may reflect that a structure predates the original or current
code’s adoption.237 For instance, in a zoning district that allows only one residential structure on
each lot, a lot predating the city’s original code may have been developed with two discrete
structures.238 The nonconformity could also have arisen when a local government made a recent
amendment to its existing code, such as an amendment establishing a new, larger minimum lot
size, making the lot on which an existing home sits too small for the structure that currently
improves it.
Major disasters, such as Sandy, frequently raise questions about the fate of properties that
were considered nonconforming prior to the disaster. If the local zoning code, as originally
adopted or later amended, renders a property nonconforming, then the zoning code usually
allows the owner and subsequent owners to continue using the property, subject to certain strict
limitations.239 In these circumstances, the property is deemed legal, but nonconforming. Over the
long term, the local government’s goal is to phase out such nonconforming properties and,
234

See N.Y. Exec. Order No. 230 (Jan. 31, 2013), http://www.nyc.gov/html/om/pdf/eo/eo_230.pdf.

235

New York City Department of City Planning, Flood Resilience Text Amendment (Oct. 9, 2013),
http://www1.nyc.gov/assets/planning/download/pdf/plans/flood-resiliency/final_text.pdf.
236

See id.

237

See JUERGENSMEYER ET AL., supra note 223, §4:31.

238

See 2 N.Y. ZONING LAW & PRAC. §10:02.

239

See 36 N.J. PRAC., LAND USE LAW §22.2 (3d ed.).

PRE-PUBLICATION DRAFT: Please cite from published version
generally speaking, to prevent the owner from increasing the extent of the nonconformity.240 But
the local government must do so in a manner that respects an owner’s property rights.
Local zoning codes also ordinarily contain a provision calling for elimination of a
nonconforming structure should the structure suffer substantial damage. Substantial damage
often means a loss estimated at between 25% and 75% of the structure’s value.241 Further,
changes to nonconforming properties are subject to tight restriction. For instance, any expansion
of existing nonconforming structures or uses is usually forbidden. Some local governments
require owners to navigate the time-consuming and potentially expensive public hearing process
if the owner seeks to make any type of alteration to a nonconforming structure.242
On the one hand, eliminating nonconformities to the local zoning code is a good goal,
and even has a hazard mitigation component. Local governments rely on zoning code
requirements to help ensure the health and safety of their community.243 This goal is achieved
when the local government succeeds in eliminating nonconforming conditions that might make a
property unusually susceptible to loss or damage during a hazard event.244 In this respect, a
disaster could be a boon to a local government’s efforts to eliminate nonconforming uses, lot
sizes, and structures. If a disaster displaces a family that occupies a nonconforming property,
then the long-term recovery period from a disaster would seem to be an appropriate time to
require the family to build a new structure that conforms to existing zoning rules (if that is a
possible option).
On the other hand, restrictions on post-storm repairs to, and modifications of,
nonconforming properties may undermine a community’s post-storm recovery, particularly in
low- and moderate-income communities where property owners may lack access to resources to
rebuild in full compliance with existing zoning. It is important to consider whether the
nonconformity at issue should prevent a family or business from repairing a structure and, as a
240
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result, potentially slow a neighborhood’s recovery. If the nonconformity does not directly impair
resilience to known hazards, then a community’s recovery may be best served by allowing these
nonconforming properties to be modified or rebuilt without imposing additional legal
obligations, such as additional public hearing requirements.
Properties whose lots do not meet threshold requirements for lot size are, for example,
considered nonconforming. In some jurisdictions, such as Hoboken, New Jersey, a majority of
the city’s lots likely do not conform to zoning code requirements.245 A property lacking the
minimum square footage for a lot in a particular zoning district must seek a variance for any
modification of the nonconforming property, even if that modification is intended to help
mitigate the impacts of future hazard events.246 But experiences from the Sandy long-term
recovery suggest that not all nonconformities should be treated the same. If the proposed repair
to, or modification of, a nonconforming property makes that property more resilient to future
hazards, even if it remains nonconforming in some other way, there is a strong argument that the
repair or modification should be encouraged to help facilitate community recovery and motivate
owners to take steps to mitigate future loss. Local governments like Hoboken, faced with a long
list of urgent post-disaster tasks, may take months or years to clarify whether and how
homeowners seeking to repair or modify nonconforming properties may do so, thereby
hampering both individual and community recovery.
In the wake of a disaster, local government development offices are swamped with
requests for review.247 If, before the hazard occurs, local governments can take steps to thin the
ranks of potential applicants for zoning approvals by eliminating the requirement that
nonconforming lot sizes obtain variances for any type of modifications, then the local
government will have succeeded in streamlining the path to recovery for a family or business.
Importantly, this efficiency can be achieved without ceding any important community goals for
safety and disaster resilience.
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3. Use restrictions: Obstacles to post-storm rehabilitation when compliance with federal
flood insurance program requirements force homeowners to run afoul of use
restrictions
Local zoning codes, together with the local government’s map of its various zoning districts,
give a zoning designation to every property within a particular jurisdiction.248 Some properties
are designated commercial, others residential, and still others mixed use—just to name a few
common designations. A zoning designation is critical because that designation dictates a
parcel’s allowable uses.249 A property zoned “residential” must, for example, be used only for
residential activities and generally cannot support any commercial uses as a principal use. A
zoning district’s use designation also limits ancillary activities in which an owner can engage. 250
It is common, for instance, that residential zoning districts establish strict requirements for
parking vehicles.
Major disaster events can trigger exacting requirements for repairing and rebuilding
structures. These requirements sometimes force individuals to rethink the fundamental design or
layout of their homes or businesses. A critical consideration that homeowners and business
owners face following flood- or storm surge-related disaster events is ensuring that the new or
rehabilitated structure complies with FEMA requirements and thus can be insured at reasonable
rates under the NFIP.251 Compliance with the NFIP may, however, create a hardship for building
owners when federal regulations conflict with local zoning codes. For instance, in a
neighborhood of attached row house buildings where elevation is difficult or impossible, owners
may be forced to eliminate residential use below the DFE to make the building NFIP
compliant.252 This leaves owners with three ways to recoup that lost floor area.
The first option is to convert the area below the DFE to parking, which is allowed under
NFIP regulations. However, in municipalities such as Hoboken, New Jersey, many zoning
248
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districts restrict ground-floor parking in order to create pedestrian-friendly active streetscapes,
thus requiring a difficult-to-attain variance for parking uses.253 The second option is to convert
the space to commercial use such as office or retail, which, unlike residential space, can be dry
floodproofed. Again, though, many zoning codes strictly limit or completely bar retail or office
use in residential neighborhoods.254 A final solution is to build an additional story on the top of
the existing structure or to construct a rear yard addition. But, as discussed earlier in this section,
such changes are only possible if the existing building has not already maximized the height
limit or building envelope allowable under existing zoning. If none of these three options is
possible, owners may be forced to choose between giving up a percentage of useable living space
in order to comply with the NFIP or, if the building is not mortgaged, opting out of the NFIP and
exposing themselves to future uninsured risks.

VI. Conclusion
Developing effective disaster recovery programs—particularly federal programs with nationwide
reach—will always be difficult in a large country like the United States, which presents a wide
array of local contexts in which recovery policies must be applied.255 Consider that strong homerule power granted local governments could serve to frustrate the implementation of some state
and federal policies. Consider also how jurisdictional borders that slice through metropolitan
areas blunt effectual regional planning and coordination256 and allow state and local officials
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from neighboring jurisdictions to chart sometimes divergent courses to recovery.257 Meaningful
recovery from catastrophic disasters occurs only if it unfolds on the local level. Federal, state,
and local governments must partner to ensure that disaster planning includes identifying potential
local impediments to recovery and creating reasonable approaches to overcoming those barriers.
More than five years removed from Superstorm Sandy, the affected region’s recovery
continues to yield valuable lessons that can help officials in other places prepare for future
catastrophic events. The Sandy recovery process has illustrated that, despite the many lessons
learned since Hurricane Katrina and even as far back as the Portsmouth fire in 1802, recovery
policy remains a challenge because no two disasters, even in the same location, will have the
same impacts. As a result, whatever laws, regulations, and policies that exist at the time of one
disaster will never fully address the exigencies associated with a subsequent event. But the
Sandy long-term recovery also highlights that there are many recovery challenges that, even if
flagged as problematic at one point in time, remain unresolved from disaster to disaster due to
their political, legal, or logistical complexity. Therefore, it is instructive to analyze the Sandy
region’s journey through long-term recovery to isolate valuable lessons that can help other
communities affected by future disasters avoid some of the challenges that have slowed or
stymied recovery efforts after Sandy.
This Article highlights several of the legal levers that the region’s affected communities
used to promote a quicker, more efficient, and more equitable long-term recovery by working
within existing legal and policy constraints. It also underscores the legal obstacles that may have
contributed to the New York and New Jersey region’s uneven recovery. We examine these
failures because they may aid other disaster-impacted regions to make better decisions about
long-term recovery, including communities dealing with more recent disasters in Florida, Puerto
Rico, and Texas. We are mindful that these pitfalls can become levers for positive change only if
local governments address legal problems and deficiencies well in advance of potential hazard
events. And, we note that this Article inevitably leaves some challenges unexamined, such as the
lack of federal recovery support for undocumented families or the sometimes onerous
complexity of paperwork that creates hardships for residents who do not speak English or have
limited time to deal with complex and time-consuming application processes.
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There are many lessons to be learned from Sandy and many legal and policy implications
of these lessons. This concluding section provides six brief practical recommendations designed
to help local officials think about how they can prepare to address long-term recovery challenges
in their own jurisdictions well before the need arises.
Lesson 1: Advocate for amending existing federal disaster recovery policies to provide
for greater flexibility in state and local implementation. At the federal level, perhaps the most
important lesson from Sandy is that recovery programs need to be more flexible, especially
FEMA programs including the NFIP, which have not always translated well to the Sandy
region’s specific physical landscape and the economic challenges faced by many residents. In
parts of the country where mismatch between federal policy and local realities may be
anticipated, state and local governments can work through their congressional representatives to
address these kinds of issues. New York City officials, in particular, have been vocal advocates
for modifying federal recovery rules to be more flexible regarding contextual issues like those
outlined here. However, it is important to understand that flexibility comes at a price. Given the
federal government’s fear of graft and misuse of recovery funds as well as the political and
philosophical skirmishes over the appropriate federal role in disaster recovery, these challenges
are likely to persist.
Lesson 2: Spend the time and resources to develop internal recovery capacity. While the
federal government is the primary funder of disaster recovery aid, it only administers some of the
many recovery programs that communities and constituents will need to access after a
devastating disaster. State governments must shoulder a significant burden designing programs
and administering CDBG-DR funds while local governments will likely need to provide
technical assistance to affected residents attempting to navigate the complexities of FEMA, SBA
programs, and the way those programs interface with local ordinances. Further, local
governments will need to work with other federal agencies that may have purview over various
aspects of the overall recovery process, such as the U.S. Department of Transportation, the
Corps, the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, and many others.
While many communities have designated and standing emergency management staff,
their responsibilities and energies typically focus on short-term emergency response, and their
expertise in long-term recovery may be more limited. State and local officials including elected
representatives, city planners, legal departments, and those with responsibilities for community
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development, economic development, housing, education, public works, transportation, and
other sectors should also develop familiarity with federal recovery programs pertinent to their
area of expertise. Having a working knowledge of federal recovery programs, and having that
expertise spread across multiple agencies, will help state and local governments move more
rapidly and effectively into recovery mode should the need arise.
Lesson 3: Identify potential vulnerabilities or unique attributes of the local landscape. As
important as it is for state and local governments to develop their own internal recovery capacity
by educating themselves about federal recovery programs, states and municipalities should also
think carefully about how well these existing programs will work in their own specific local
contexts. Many of the lessons learned from Sandy about the implications of local conditions are
enumerated above, such as the significant percentage of New York City residents living in
cooperatives and condominiums who were not served well by NFIP restrictions, or the
challenges of elevating attached buildings to conform with NFIP requirements. But other
localities have their own potential challenges that can be identified through careful pre-event
analysis. New Orleans had a pre-Katrina poverty rate of 26%, and a high number of homeowners
who could not establish legal title to their residence. In Puerto Rico, similar issues are now
emerging in the recovery from Hurricane Maria. Other potential issues may be pertinent in other
places. Whether it is the percentage of elderly or undocumented residents or unique land
development patterns, each of these facts creates obstacles to recovery that can, at least to some
degree, be anticipated in advance and dealt with.
Lesson 4: Evaluate local code requirements to flag potential legal obstacles to recovery.
As its name suggests, long-term recovery unfolds over an extended time horizon. But once the
decision to rebuild is made, local governments can, at a minimum, take steps to ensure that
processes and procedures are in place to facilitate recovery. A local government, for instance,
cannot necessarily expect to commit resources to evaluating and revising its local zoning code in
the wake of a disaster. New York City did so after Sandy, but it required a significant
expenditure of resources and took almost a year to put permanent changes in place. Hoboken and
Long Beach also eventually modified their zoning codes to facilitate more resilient rebuilding
and conformity with NFIP requirements, but it took time. Immediately following a disaster,
however, it would be more desirable if local governments and elected officials could focus on the
actual rebuilding process as opposed to removing internal legal barriers.
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For communities that would hope to avoid the kinds of self-imposed legal barriers to
effective recovery outlined here, such flawed legal infrastructure can be hard to detect. Existing
laws that seem beneficial in “blue sky” situations may only emerge as barriers to effective
recovery when issues like speed, flexibility, and efficiency become critically important, such as
when dozens or hundreds of desperate property owners hoping to start rebuilding after a disaster
overwhelm local site plan review or variance processes. The time to identify and remove these
types of local law-related impediments to recovery and community resilience is before disaster
strikes. Local governments should begin work as soon as feasible to upgrade local laws and
regulations to make it easier, or mandatory, or even just possible, for residents to build more
resilient buildings today as well as rebuild more resiliently after a disaster.
Lesson 5: Be prepared to develop state and local programs to fill gaps: States and local
governments should also understand that, no matter how much they lobby for federal
programmatic changes, there will inevitably be issues that federal programs are unable to
address. Developing local knowledge about the structure and limitations of federal programs and
understanding local barriers to recovery can help communities quickly pivot to a recovery stance.
But local officials are also advised to expend efforts now to, at minimum, think about how they
might address some of the known challenges from other disasters through their own state or local
programs. For instance, New York City, New York state, and New Jersey developed housing
programs specifically to assist residents of cooperatives, mobile homes, and other types of
housing poorly served by federal programs. While some of these approaches might be funded by
CDBG-DR, allocations may not be sufficient to address all needs. Federal regulations may also
limit how funds can be spent. Local governments may also need to provide cash grants or other
publicly funded solutions such as permit waivers, tax abatements, or free technical assistance if
they wish to ensure effective resident and business recovery.
Lesson 6: Advocate for coordinated action among local governments. If a code
deficiency is limited to a single jurisdiction, the local government can, of course, act on its own.
But what if the code problem is more widespread? The post-Sandy recovery period shows how
multiple jurisdictions in the region encountered similar kinds of code-related problems that
caused unnecessary post-disaster redevelopment delays. The reality of shared zoning code
deficiencies suggests the value of considering potential strategies to help groups of local
governments amend their zoning codes in a fair and efficient manner—and to do so before
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disaster strikes. Disasters such as Sandy affect multiple cities and towns across one or more
states. Thus, it is important to consider how local governments can act in concert so that a
metropolitan region’s recovery is not uneven. A metropolitan region has a better chance to
recover if its member communities share a commitment to setting long-term recovery strategies
and goals. Without such cooperation, it is possible that recovery will lag in communities that
lacked the resources or initiative to improve their zoning laws. Federal, state, nonprofit, and forprofit stakeholders should be invited to participate and provide technical assistance.
Long-term recovery is uneven and unfolds slowly, or, as global disaster recovery scholars
Laurie A. Johnson and Robert B. Olshansky bluntly state in their most recent book, “It is never
easy, and it is never fast enough for affected residents.”258 Local and state governments play an
essential role in facilitating recovery or at least a sense of a sustainable “new normal.” By
working with federal and nongovernmental partners to anticipate and remove legal barriers to
homeowner and business recovery, local and state governments can help to ensure that disaster
recovery does not become a “two-tier” process where some members of a community rebound
quickly while others struggle to return or rebuild. Cities, counties, towns, and states must come
together prior to a disaster to study, identify, and address community vulnerabilities of all kinds,
including legal barriers and vulnerabilities. In so doing, they are taking essential steps toward
ensuring that no individual, family, or business becomes mired in regulatory footfalls and, as a
consequence, is left worse off than before the disaster.
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